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Article 2

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE
URBAN COMMONS
Sheila R Foster*
Urban residents share access to a number of local resources in which
they have a common stake. These resources range from local streets and
parks to public spaces, to a variety of shared neighborhoodamenities. Collectively shared urban resources suffer from the same rivalry and free-riding
problems that Garrett Hardin described in his Tragedy of the Commons
tale. Scholars have not yet worked up a theory about how this "tragedy"
unfolds in the urban context, particularly in light of existing government
regulation and control of common urban resources. This Article argues that
the tragedy of the urban commons unfolds duringperiods of "regulatory slippage "-when the level of local government oversight and management of the
resource significantly declines, leaving the resource vulnerable to expanded
access by competing users and uses. Overuse or unrestrainedcompetition in
the use of these resources can quickly lead to congestion, rivalry, and resource
degradation. Tales abound in cities across the country of streets, parks, and
vacant land that were once thriving urban spaces but have become overrun,
dity, prone to criminal activity, and virtually abandoned by most users.
Proposed solutions to the rivalry, congestion, and degradation that
afflict common urban resources typically track the traditionalpublic-private
© 2011 Sheila R. Foster. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Albert A. Walsh Professor and Vice Dean, Fordham Law School. This Article
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conversations with many colleagues and friends. My deepest gratitude to the
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dichotomy of governance approaches. These solutions propose either a more
assertive central government role or privatization of the resource. Neither of
these proposedsolutions has taken root, I argue, because of the potential costs
that each carry-costs to the local government during times offiscal strain,
costs to communities where the majority of residents are non-property owners,
and costs to internalcommunity governance. What has taken root, however,
are various forms of cooperative management regimes by groups of users.
Despite the robust literature on self-organized management of natural
resources, scholars have largely ignored collective action in the urban context.
In fact, many urban scholars have assumed that collective action is unlikely
in urban communities where social disorder exists.
This Article highlights the ways in which common urban resources are
being managed by groups of users in the absence of government coercion or
management and without transferringownership into private hands. This
collective action occurs in the shadow of continued state and local government ownership and oversight of the resources. Formally, although the state
continues to hold the regulatory reigns, in practice we see the public role
shifting away from a centralized governmental role to what I call an "enabling" one in which state and local governments provide incentives and lend
support to private actors who are able to overcome free-ridingand coordination problems to manage collective resources. This Article develops this enabling role, marks its contours and limits, and raises three normative concerns
that have gone unattended by policymakers.
INTRODUCTION

Urban residents share access to a number of local tangible and
intangible resources in which they have a common stake. These
resources range from local streets and parks to public spaces to a variety of shared neighborhood amenities. These collectively shared
urban resources-what I call "urban commons"-are subject to the
same rivalry and free-rider problems that Garrett Hardin wrote about
in his Tragedy of the Commons tale. In this classic tale, Hardin warned
of the depletion of open-access natural resources where it is difficult
to exclude potential users who lack incentives to conserve or sustainably use the resource.' Many collectively shared, open-access urban
resources have much in common with Hardin's conception of the
"pasture open to all" prone to overuse or misuse if improperly managed or regulated. 2
The urban "commons" generally shares with traditional public
goods both a lack of rivalry in consumption (nonrivalrous) and lack of
excludability in access to and enjoyment of their benefits (nonexclud1 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244 (1968).

2 Id.
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able). But they share these characteristics only up to a point.' That
point is what I will refer to as "regulatory slippage," and it occurs when
the level of local government control or oversight of the resource significantly declines, for whatever reason.4 During periods of regulatory
slippage, the temptation to create rivalrous conditions exists for a variety of actors whether they are ordinary pedestrians, opportunistic
criminals, or frequent park users. Such users might be tempted to use
or consume the common resource in ways that degrade the value or
attractiveness of the resource for other types of users and uses. It is at
this point when the shared urban resource comes to resemble less of a
public good (nonexcludable, nonrivalrous) and more of a traditional
"commons" (nonexcludable, rivalrous), subject to the sort of tragedy
depicted in Hardin's tale. 5
Too much usage (either in volume or intensity) of a park or a
neighborhood street, for example, can quickly result in congestion.
Similarly, certain types or intensity of uses can create incompatibilities
with many ordinary uses and conservation of such spaces. 6 Overuse or
unrestrained competition in use of the space creates conditions which
begin to mimic the type of commons problem that Hardin wrote
about-that is, such resources become rivalrous and prone to degradation and perhaps destruction.
Tales abound in many cities of dirty and unsafe streets, parks, and
vacant lots that were once thriving urban spaces, but became overrun
and degraded in a classic tragedy of the commons scenario. Roy
Rosenzweig and Elizabeth Blackmar's history of Central Park recounts
one of the most famous examples of how a common urban resource
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antipropety, 102
L. REV. 1, 13 (2003) (comparing "pure" and "impure" public goods and arguing that parks and other open spaces "admit of nonrivalrous uses only to a certain
point").
4 See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 297, 299-300 (1999) (defining
positive and negative regulatory slippage; the former refers to action which gets ahead
of regulatory baselines or standards, whereas the latter refers to actions that fall
behind those baselines or standards).
5 Traditionally, the "commons" or "common-pool resource" is a natural or manmade resource in which (a) "it is costly to exclude individuals from using the good
either through physical barriers or legal instruments and, (b) the benefits consumed
by one individual subtract from the benefits available to others." See ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONs 30 (1990). That is, the resource is characterized by nonexcludability and rivalry. See id.
6 For example, low intensity uses of urban parks (such as bird watching) are
nonrivalrous, whereas other high intensity uses (like intensive hunting) are incompatible with other uses (e.g., intensive hiking) and with conservation or long-term sustainability of the resource. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 13.
3
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became rivalrous and subject to overuse and degradation. 7 After years
of opening up the park to permit a wide variety of events and groups
to use the park, Central Park quickly became a space in which access
to the "whole community" posed inevitable conflicts and competition
between users.8 Many saw the park as deteriorating rapidly due to its
openness to various events and a potpourri of users, resulting in
increased maintenance and cleanup costs which the city was not able
to absorb. This deterioration escalated with the onset of the fiscal crisis in the 1970s and the decline in city appropriations, which devastated the entire urban park system, leaving many parks and
recreational areas unsafe, dirty, prone to criminal activity, and virtually abandoned by most users.9
A similar story can be told about the "neighborhood commons"
in many urban communities.10 The quality of a neighborhood commons-of its street life, sidewalks, open spaces, and public parksmight begin to decline through increasing demands by different users
and uses of the space. Demands may overwhelm or confound the ability of government resources to manage and that makes managing the
rivalry between users difficult. Lacking such management, the
increase in certain types of uses of common space-such as in the case
of excessive loitering, aggressive panhandling, graffiti, or litteringwill eventually begin to rival, if not overwhelm, other users and uses of
this space. 1 Such "chronic street nuisances," for example, will ultimately require either a system of more assertive government control,

7

See generally Roy
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BLAcKMAR,

THE PARK AND THE PEO-

(1992) (discussing the evolution of Central Park and the different classes of people who have used it over time).
8 See id. at 498.
9 See id. at 501-02; see also Michael Murray, Private Management of Public Spaces:
Nonprofit Organizationsand Urban Parks, 34 HARv. ENV-rL. L. REV. 179, 230 (2010) (telling a similar story about Bryant Park in New York City).
10 Bradley Karkkainen theorizes a conception of the "neighborhood commons"
as a set of local tangible and intangible resources in which neighborhood residents
share a stake. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 45, 68 n.91 (1994). Rather than constituting a single clearly-defined
resource, the neighborhood commons is multi-dimensional, consisting of a web of
sometimes overlapping and sometimes unrelated resources that may be used in different combinations and some parts of which are "open access" in that they may be used
by nonresidents as well. See id.
11 See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-SpaceZoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1223 (1996) ("In openaccess spaces thronged with strangers . . . free-riding is apt to afflict the informal
sector.").
PLE
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enforcement of social norms through criminal law, or some form of
private governance of these spaces.12
The commons problem is in part a problem of open access to
rivalrous resources and in part a problem of local governance. Efforts
to manage the "commons" typically vacillate between two governance
approaches that Hardin and others have developed as a response to
commons dilemmas.' 3 Averting the tragedy has traditionally been
thought to require either a system of private property rights in the
commons, in which individual owners could most efficiently internalize the costs imposed on the resource, or a central government management approach which would constrain individual users by
regulating access and use of the resource. 14 In the urban context,
Robert Ellickson's proposal for "public space zoning"--which would
allow cities to more comprehensively regulate open public spaces to
control chronic street nuisances-is a contemporary example of the
latter.' 5 Gated communities-a form of common interest development in which individual property owners own and control shares/
parts of the development, including its common spaces-is a contemporary example of the former.' 6
The choice between government regulation and privatization of
the commons does not capture the full range of approaches to com12 Id. at 1169 (defining chronic street nuisances as "when a person regularly
behaves in a public space in a way that annoys-but more than annoys-most other
users, and persists in doing so over a protracted period").
13 See OsTRoM, supra note 5, at 8-21; Hardin, supra note 1, at 1245.
14 See Garrett Hardin, Living on a Lifeboat, in MANAGING THE COMMONs 210, 213
(John A. Baden & Douglas S. Noonan eds., 2d ed. 1998) ("Under a system of private
property the man of group of men who own property recognize their responsibility to
care for it, for if they don't they will eventually suffer."); id. (remarking that overpopulation of the commons had no "technical solution" and therefore required
"mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon"). See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967) (discussing the concept and
role of property rights).
15 See Ellickson, supra note 11, at 1226.
16 See Setha Low, How Private Interests Take Over Public Space: Zoning, Taxes, and
Incorporationof Gated Communities, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE 81, 88 (Setha Low
& Neil Smith eds., 2006) (demonstrating that the dramatic increase in the development of these communities, along with the continued growth of homeowner associations, has marked a "social revolution in governance" of the urban commons with
private organizations responsible for maintaining residential common areas and
where private enforcement of covenants has replaced municipal oversight in regulating the environment by zoning); Shin Lee & Chris Webster, Enclosure of the Urban
Commons, 66 GEOJOURNAL 27, 27 (2006) (noting that in many different cultures and
economies around the world new forms of local territorial governance are emerging
in cities to make joint consumption more sustainable).
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mons management, as Elinor Ostrom has famously demonstrated in
her work on self-organized, cooperative natural resource management
regimes.' 7 Her work, and the work of others,' 8 introduces a third
option for avoiding the tragedy of the commons; namely, a regime in
which a group of users is able to overcome collective action problems
and manage a common resource without government coercion or the
vesting of individual (or group) property rights in the commons.
Although the literature on self-organized management of natural
resources has been well developed by Ostrom and others, 19 such collective action has been largely neglected and underdeveloped in the
context of urban resources. Instead, social scientists and legal scholars have tended to highlight the lack of collective efficacy in urban
communities where social disorder in public spaces exists. 20 This Article instead highlights the ways in which rivalrous and degraded common urban resources are being collectively restored and managed by
groups of users in the absence of government coercion and (often)
oversight, and without transferring ownership of the resources into
private hands. As others have noted, an important element of collective resource management regimes is that such regimes are often supported in important ways by central government authorities. 21 The
support of central authorities is an important element in users' ability
to overcome free-riding and coordination problems to manage collective urban resources. In the urban context, this enabling role is especially important to understand given the local government's
ownership, authority, and control over common urban resources.
17 See OSTROM, supra note 5, at 8-21.
18 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 123 (1991) (demonstrating that people resolve disputes cooperatively without regard to laws applying to those
disputes); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 749 (1986) (discussing as a "middle ground"
between government ownership and private property rights the possibility and existence of a "managed commons, where usage as a commons is not tragic but rather
capable of self-management by orderly and civilized people").
19 See generally OSTROM, supra note 5 (examining case studies focused on natural
resources). But see Rose, supra note 18, at 739-50, 765-66 (discussing "inherently
public property" doctrines from the nineteenth century which vested some property
rights in the "unorganized public" to open access land capable of customary selfmanagement).
20 See infra note 132.
21 See OSTROM, supra note 5, at 190 (finding that the activities of external public
authorities can be positive factors in helping collectivities to self-organize); see also
Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 578
(2001) (recognizing that background legal rules can provide a "safety net" that
"enables commoners, without taking prohibitive individual risks, to gain benefits that
flow from trusting one another").
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This type of enabling of cooperation among private actors to
manage an open access, common resource is what I term collective
action enabling. There are clear benefits, and costs, to collective action
enabling which I describe in this Article. However, the main point is
to delineate and develop the concept of collective action enabling and
to compare and contrast it with the traditional public-private binary
approaches to urban commons management. By articulating the contours of collective action enabling in this Article, I hope to bring a
theory to a practice that has become ubiquitous in cities across the
nation, and to provoke a more sustained examination of the relationship between public and private actors in managing common urban
resources.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the concept of
regulatory slippage and its role in transforming a previously managed
and restricted common resource to an increasingly open and rivalrous
one. It argues the need for a new governance regime to restore the
equilibrium of users that sustain the commons for the benefit of the
public. Part II reviews the different responses proposed by scholars
responding to the tragedy of urban resources that have become
rivalrous. These proposals include suggestions to re-zone public
spaces to better allocate that space among rivalrous users or, alternatively, to privatize those spaces as a way of placing control in the hands
of neighboring property owners. This Part posits that these proposals
have yet to fully take root because of their potential costs-costs to the
government during times of fiscal strain and costs to the communities
in which these resources are located. It then introduces the possibility
that resource users can manage these resources collectively and highlights the important role that central governments can play in incentivizing and supporting these efforts.
Part III offers examples of some of the urban collective management regimes. These examples include those already familiar to legal
scholars: Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), which allow commercial property owners and merchants to maintain the neighborhood commons,2 2 and Park Conservancies, which involve the
coordinated efforts of private actors working in partnership with the
local government to manage major urban parks. 23 Less discussed
22

Scholars have written about BIDs, mainly through the lens of sublocal govern-

ance. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 365 (1999) (discussing the rapid

spread of BIDs as one of the most important developments to occur recently in American cities).
23 See generally ALEXANDER GARVIN ET AL., URBAN PARKS AND OPEN SPACE (1997)
(describing derelict areas that were developed into thriving parks and discussing the
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examples in the literature include more informal groups, like neighborhood foot patrols and community gardeners that establish and
enforce positive norms of conduct in neighborhood open spaces. In
each of these examples, private actors overcome collective action
problems (primarily the temptation to free-ride on others' efforts)
and pool their efforts to maintain, oversee, and manage a common
urban resource.
Part III also observes an inverse relationship between the level of
enabling offered by central government authorities and the endogenous factors that are highly correlated with the success of cooperative
management regimes-factors like community size and knittedness,
shared norms, and relatively small size of the resource. Where those
factors are present in the examples discussed, there seems to be less of
a strong government-enabling role that supports the collective management regime. There is a much more significant government-enabling role present as the scale and complexity of the resource, and the
heterogeneity of the users, increases.
Part IV then turns to the nature of the government-enabling role
and marks its contours and limitations. While local (and state) governments provide various levels of support and incentives to cooperative resource management regimes, they retain their regulatory
authority and ultimate control over the resource. Central governments neither transfer ownership of the resource to private actors nor
cede (or delegate) to those actors their regulatory or policymaking
role over these resources. We might instead understand these groups
as supplementing, and not supplanting, the goods and services that
local government traditionally provides.
Part V identifies some of the risks, or costs, of collective action
enabling. Specifically, it articulates three concerns that scholars and
policymakers should attend to as this form of enabling is considered
more carefully. These three concerns are the risks of scaling up collective management of common urban resources, the distributional
issues inherent in enabling discrete groups of private actors to manage urban commons, and the real threat of ossification when these
groups or collectivities become deeply entrenched and prove difficult
to disband.
I.

THEORIZING THE URBAN COMMONS

Contemporary urban commons dilemmas arise not from an
unregulated space "open to all," as in Hardin's example, but rather
revitalization of urban areas); Murray, supra note 9 (discussing how nonprofit organizations take responsibility for and create positive outcomes for public spaces).
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from a highly regulated space which has slipped significantly behind
previous levels of public control or management. 2 4 The traditional
commons has as its baseline an open access resource, the use of which
is unrestricted or unregulated and which allows uncoordinated actors
to overuse or overexploit the resource. This conception of the commons is illustrated first and foremost by the logic of Hardin's tale. As
he explains, each herdsman is motivated by self-interest to continue
adding cattle to an open pasture until the combined actions of the
herdsmen results in overgrazing, depleting the shared resource for all
herdsmen. 25 In other words, the result of the overgrazing is
suboptimal.2 6
The idea of the commons in Hardin's tale captures property in its
natural, pre-political, undisciplined state in which "everyone has privi2 7 As he
leges of inclusion and no one has rights of exclusion."
argued, absent a system of private enterprise or government control
(i.e., allocation of use and other rights), it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to restrain the impulse of users to pursue their individual
self-interests even when pursuit of those interests result in the degradation or exhaustion of the resource. 28 Such "freedom in the conmons"-i.e., the lack of controls on individual behavior and self29
interest-ultimately leads to its ruin and hence to the "tragedy."
24 See Farber, supra note 4, at 301-03 (describing "negative" slippage as a failure
to act or lax supervision by regulators, as well as noncompliance with existing standards by regulated parties).
25 See Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244 ("As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to
maximize his gain. . . . [Thus e]ach man is locked into a system that compels him to
increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited."); see also Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons, 9 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 199, 199
(1994) ("[A]lI exploiters suffer in an unmanaged common.").
26 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. L. REV. 907, 914
n.31, 919-22 (2004) (pointing out the distinction between distributive problems in
the commons, in which users consume more than their "share," and Hardin's tragedy,
in which users consume the resources beyond the point that they produce marginal
benefits for anyone).
27 Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics ofProperty Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs LAw 79, 84 (2001).
28 See Hardin, supranote 1, at 1244-45 (arguing that individual users of the commons would always enjoy the full benefit of their use, but absorb only a small fraction
of the marginal cost of that use).
29 Hardin, supra note 1 at 1244. As others have pointed out, there are many
assumptions embedded in this tale that may not bear out in reality. One such assumption is that of scarcity. For example, in the case of "plenteous" goods-those
resources that are so plentiful or unbounded-it may be that there is enough supply
relative to demand that the difficulty or cost of imposing a system of controls outweighs the gains of careful resource management. See Rose, supra note 18, at 717-18.
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Conceived as such, there are very few "pure" commons that exist today
in the United States. That is, there are few open access resources
without some controls imposed on access and use, either by public
authorities or private owners of open space. The nation's natural
resources-the quintessential commons30 -are controlled and regulated by federal and state agencies. Similarly, open spaces in the
urban environment-streets, parks, sidewalks, etc.-are governed by a
host of regulations.
The potential for the commons dilemma, or "tragedy," exists notwithstanding the type of government control that Hardin and others
posited as one way out of the tragedy.3 1 The contention of this Article
is that a similar dynamic can arise with shared urban resources as a
result of regulatory slippage. Under conditions of regulatory slippage,
government authorities fail to enforce existing regulatory controls
and/or tolerate widespread noncompliance with them by users of the
resource. This slippage, in turn, can lead to congestion and/or rivalry
as users who may have been previously excluded from, or constrained
in their use of, the common resource are able to more freely access
and exploit the resource for their own use. The overuse, or overconsumption, of the type of urban resources can lead to "tragedy" in the
sense that overuse or overexploitation increases the cost for all users
of the resource while providing a benefit only to a limited class of
users. Under conditions of regulatory slippage, the governance question arises anew. In other words, when unrestrained competition for
collectively shared resources intensifies, so too does the impetus to
reassign the structure of rights to protect against degradation or overexploitation of the resource.32
A.

Regulatory Slippage

Open access urban resources-streets, sidewalks, empty lots,
parks, etc.-are regulated by local governments under their traditional land use authority and police power.33 Such regulations tend to
prohibit or constrain specific types of uses, conduct and/or activities
in open public spaces as a way of managing shared resources in light
of the volume and diversity of users who have access to them.3 4 For
30 See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 1, at 1245 (using the example of the National
Parks, which are "open to all, without limit").
31 See OSTROM, supra note 5, at 8-9.
32 See Lee & Webster, supra note 16, at 28.
33 See generally infra Part V.A (examining the concern about scale).
34 A more critical perspective is that some of these laws are often created and
used as a form of social control to exclude the socially marginal from public spaces.
See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Steve Herbert, Dealingwith Disorder: Social Control in the
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example, local governments often have outright bans or restrictions
on loitering, littering, camping, sitting, alcohol use, graffiti, panhandling, etc. in public spaces. Regulations such as designated park
hours, limits on dog users, and limits on large gatherings of users in
public spaces are ubiquitous examples of how local governments manage open access urban spaces in light of the demands placed on them
by different users. Additionally, many criminal laws limit various types
of behavior that might occur in a public space and are part of the
regulatory landscape of urban spaces.
In simple terms, regulatory slippage refers to a marked decline in
the enforcement of these standards and/or the increasing tolerance
of noncompliance with these standards by users of a given public
space.35 The concept of regulatory slippage used here has no strong
normative content; it does not imply that there is necessarily some
optimal level of regulation.36 As I argue below, there are many reasons that might account for slippage in regard to the regulation and
management of open or public spaces. Rather, the concept of regulatory slippage simply bears witness to a decline in the management or
control of a common resource over which public authorities have formal governing authority.
Under certain circumstances, regulatory slippage might be a
37
completely rational choice on the part of a local government. Local
governments require resources to monitor and enforce access and use
restrictions, resources for which many different local needs increasingly compete.3 8 Notably, regulatory slippage in the urban context
often occurs during times of declining government resources or when
government is faced with an overwhelming demand on those
resources beyond what the government can effectively manage, given
its other priorities and limited resources. 39
Regulatory slippage might also signal that some access and use
restrictions are unreasonable, unrealistic, or insufficiently attentive to
Post-IndustrialCity, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 5-30 (2008) (arguing that local governments' adoption of novel social control techniques including off-limit orders,
parks exclusion laws, and expansion of trespass laws increases the number of behaviors and people defined as criminal and subject to formal social control).
35 Another way of thinking about the concept is by imagining an increasing gap
between regulatory standards and the enforcement of those standards on regulated
parties. See Farber, supra note 4, at 300 (noting the pervasiveness of regulatory slippage in the environmental law context).
36 See id. at 325.
37 See id.
38 See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 7, at 502-03 (using Central Park as an
example of this tension).
39 See id.
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changed usage patterns, giving rise to widespread noncompliance
with these restrictions and an increase in monitoring and enforcement costs. 40 A decline in enforcement of statutory standards or in
previous levels of regulatory oversight might be the result of a conscious decision on the part of governing authorities to allow or tolerate minor violations of standards and mandates. 4 1 Alternatively, or
additionally, slippage might signal a simple lack of resources to devote
to enforcement of regulatory standards and mandates in the face of
widespread violations.4 2
B.

Congestion and Rivalry

Regardless of the reasons underlying regulatory slippage, the government's inability or unwillingness to effectively manage and control
common spaces can leave those spaces vulnerable to expanded access
by competing and/or incompatible uses. This slippage can result in
the transformation of what might have been a previously managed or
restricted resource into a more open access, rivalrous "commons."4 3
"Rivalrousness" is typically a reference to the consumption of a good
and the extent to which consumption by one individual diminishes
the availability of that good to others. 4 4 In Hardin's example, the
tragedy of the commons results from the fact that one herdsman's
consumption of a unit of the pasture reduces the amount available to
other herdsmen. 45 The "tragedy" in many common pool urban
resources is in part a consumption problem and in part a congestion,
or crowding, problem.4 6 Crowding and congestion create rivalry
when the volume and/or type of use (or users) generate excess
demand on the resource or demands fundamentally in tension with
one another. 47
40 See Farber, supra note 4, at 325.
41 See id. at 320.
42 See id.
43 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Questioning CulturalCommons, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
817, 822-23 (2010) (explaining that consumption of a good is rivalrous if consumption by one individual diminishes the opportunity of other individuals).
45 See Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244 ("Adding together the component partial
utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to
pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another. ... But this is
the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons.
Therein is the tragedy.").
46 See id.
47 See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 13-14 (explaining the rivalry
that occurs when one use is conservation, which is fundamentally incompatible with
any other use).
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As Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have astutely
pointed out, common resources such as public parks are nonrivalrousness to the extent that they accommodate "low intensity" uses in moderation. 48 The more frequent or intense a particular use becomes, the
more incompatible that use becomes with other uses; this is even
more true when the scale of the resource brings these incompatible
uses into greater tension.4 9 Moreover, a strong preference for conservation of a resource can be quite incompatible with a strong preference for consumption or exploitation of that resource.5 0 In an
environment of regulatory slippage, when certain uses or users are
intensified, or ratcheted up, exclusion becomes difficult, if not impossible. That is, the relaxation of government oversight and management creates opportunities for overexploitation of the resource by
particular user groups or types of uses.5 1 The resulting congestion
and rivalry paves the way for the "tragedy," which occurs when the
frequency and intensity of particular types of uses and/or groups of
users push out other uses and users that are more compatible with the
conservation and sustainability of the resource. 5 2 Tragedy can result
when the usefulness and quality of the resource is degraded or
destroyed for its users-the public.
Imagine a park that is frequented by dog owners, families with
young children, teenage skateboarders, and transient populations
who sleep on public benches overnight. Intense rivalry between these
users is avoided because these uses occur in identifiably distinct sections of the park or at distinctly different times. Coexistence and compatibility are possible either through the enforcement of park rules
and regulations, or by customary practice adhered to by virtually everyone. Typically, there are local regulations that designate the time,
place, and manner of uses in parks and similar open spaces, and these
regulations (and enforcement of them) can either codify or help to
create customary practices of usage.5 3 Significant change in the customary behavior of park users coupled with slippage in the enforcement of rules that reinforce the status quo pattern of park usage can
threaten to upset the balance of these uses and can threaten intense
48 See id. at 13 (citing birdwatching as an example).
49 See id. ("For example, intensive hunting is not likely to be compatible with
intensive hiking within a confined area.").
50 See id.
51 SeeJames Grimmelmann, The Internet is a Semicommons, 78 FoRDHAM L. REV.
2799, 2808 (2010) ("Exclusion and governance both depend on a source of authority
to enforce the rules that recreate excludability.").
52 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 13-14.
53 See Ellickson, supra note 11, at 1232, 1244.
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rivalry between them, leading to potential overexploitation of the
resource by one or more groups of users.
Now imagine that dog owners began to frequent other parts of
the park where families and children play and fail to clean up after
their pets, and/or fail to keep them on leashes, and are allowed to
continue to do this because of cutbacks in park policing and maintenance. At the same time, the transient homeless population also
begins to frequent the park during the day or "peak" hours due to the
lack of enforcement of rules prohibiting them from doing so. As has
happened with many urban parks, soon one or more groups of users
will intensify the frequency and scale of their use in their resource,
driving up the cost for all other users of the resource while providing
benefits to only a small class of users. By driving out other incompatible uses and users, this rivalry creates the conditions for potential degradation of the resource-typically an increase in lawlessness, a
decrease in cleanliness, and a generally dramatic decline in the quality
and usefulness of the physical resource. Whether we call this the tragedy of "overexploitation" or the tragedy of "mismanagement,"5 4 the
end result is the same. To restore the resource to a state of equilibrium between users and uses will require a new governance regime.
II.

MANAGING THE URBAN COMMONS

As the previous Part explained, urban commons "tragedies" often
arise as unrestrained competition intensifies between uses and users
as a result of regulatory slippage. 55 Because the resource remains a
public one, formally regulated by the government, the impetus to
reassign the structure of rights to protect against degradation or overexploitation of the resource can be more complicated than traditional
responses to commons tragedies might suggest. To be sure, there is
still a collective action problem at the heart of this type of urban commons tragedy, which could be responsive to either more assertive public control or private property rights. However, such solutions are
complicated by the existing public ownership and control over the
land, posing a different type of governance problem than the one traditionally confronted by the type of pure commons in Hardin's stylized scenario.
This Part describes examples of two contemporary responses to
manage open access, urban resources that have experienced a marked
decline in an environment of regulatory slippage. These solutions
tend to track the classic public-private dichotomy of responses to com54
55

See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 9.
See supra Part LB.
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mons tragedies. That is, they propose either a system of regulation
designed to cure the original regulatory failures or the granting of
private property rights in the resource as a way of realigning the
incentives of individual behavior in the commons. Neither solution,
however, seems to have taken root in the real world. This Part suggests that each type of solution carries costs that have likely impeded
their adoption by states, local governments, and communities.
Part III then introduces a third option in which groups of users
cooperate together to manage a resource that has become rivalrous
and subject to tragic conditions. Collective management of common
resources has been most developed in the natural resources literature
as an endogenous solution to the tragedy of the commons, albeit
under a specific set of conditions. Here, I introduce it as an option
for the management of common urban resources, recognizing that
the unique features of the "urban commons" necessitate a more careful consideration of the role of the government in collective commons
management regimes. Collective management regimes in the urban
context thus come to resemble a type of hybrid solution that is peculiar to its context, in part because of the government's existing regulatory and ownership role over the resources. This portion of the paper
will begin to demonstrate that collective management of the urban
commons depends both on the cooperation of resource users, some
of whom will assume significant responsibility for managing the
resource, as well as on the support of the central government to help
sustain the collective management regime.
A.

Regulation

One response to the congestion and rivalry that intensify in an
environment of regulatory slippage is to go back to the regulatory
drawing board and impose a new, perhaps more flexible scheme of
government control on the public space. The conventional wisdom is
that coordination costs and free-riding can pose an insurmountable
obstacle to private efforts to protect the urban commons from congestion or degradation.5 6 Affected private users of the commons are
unlikely to do anything about misuse or overuse of the commons
because the costs of doing so will often outweigh the benefits of taking
56 Zoning can thus be justified because by itself "private collective actions fail to
provide sufficient quantities of a desired public good." A. Dan Tarlock, Toward a
Revised Theory of Zoning, in LAND USE CONTROLS ANNUAL 145-46 (Frank S. Bangs, Jr.
ed., 1972); see Ellickson, supranote 11, at 1223 ("In open-access spaces thronged with
strangers .

.

. free-riding is apt to afflict the informal sector.").
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action to abate or manage the problems.5 7 Instead, many users who
view certain uses of the commons as competing with theirs are likely
to stay away altogether and cede the space to others. One might view
a centralized system of regulation as, at least in theory, seeking to simulate the result that would have been accomplished had users, but for
high coordination costs and free-riding, been able to impose a covenant scheme on themselves.5 8
1. Public Space Zoning
Consider Robert Ellickson's proposal to allow cities to more comprehensively regulate through their zoning power "chronic street nuisances"-e.g., annoying behavior by panhandlers, mentally ill
squatters, the homeless-that often result in a decline in the attractiveness of open urban space to other users.59 Ellickson's proposal to
adopt a system of zoning for these types of street nuisances both captures the ways in which a local government might effectively manage
rivalrous, open access urban spaces and wrestles with the costs of such
a system. Ellickson traces the genesis of increased disorderliness on
urban streets to a general relaxation and liberalization of social controls from the mid-1960s through the 1980s.60 In particular, courts'
constitutional rulings that "swept away the preexisting legal code of
the street," coupled with pedestrians' easing of informal standards of
behavior for other street users, led to a sort of tragedy of the urban
commons.6 1
Ellickson's proposal would allow a city to adopt three different
zoning codes, of varying stringency, to govern street behavior in public spaces. 6 2 An official map would designate Red, Yellow, and Green
zones and an accompanying ordinance text would articulate the rules
of the road that apply in various districts. 6 3 Green zones would promise relative safety and a high level of strictness in regulating disruptive
57 SeeEllickson, supra note 11, at 1195 ("A pedestrian who unilaterally attempts to
enforce social norms during a particular encounter on the street bears all the risks of
a confrontation with the street person, but ineluctably shares the prospective benefits
of nuisance abatement with all other users of the same public space.").
58 See Tarlock, supra note 56, at 145-46.
59 See Ellickson, supra note 11, at 1207-17.
60 See id. at 1209, 1214.
61 See id. at 1169 ("Because the panhandler's presence inhibits pedestrians, the
sidewalk is less used and the restaurant's business suffers; although the bench squatter
himself contributes to the daytime population in the plaza, the average headcount
falls because fewer pedestrians wish to linger there.").
62

See id. at 1220.
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behavior; they would be tailored to accommodate the "unusually sensitive," such as school children, frail elderly, parents with toddlers, and
the like. 6 4 Red zones would signal extreme caution as disorderly conduct in these spaces would be the most tolerated by the city; these
areas would essentially be "safe harbors" for those who engage in disorderly conduct. 65 Finally, Yellow zones would serve as a "lively mixing bowl" where some episodic disorder would be tolerated but
chronic misbehavior (e.g., panhandling and bench squatting) would
not. 6 6 Once the zones have been established, Ellickson's aspiration is
67
that individual users would enforce the "varying rules of decorum."
2.

The Costs of Regulation

Ellickson's proposal suffers from many of the shortcomings of
8
conventional zoning, a fact which he forthrightly acknowledges.6 As
Ellickson argues, enforcing land use rules like his public zoning proposal involves higher administrative costs/less efficiency, less flexibility, may lead to unjust results on vulnerable individuals and
communities, and tend to be manipulated or ignored in their application. 69 For example, in a large city with numerous and varied public
spaces, politicians might be apt to distribute Green Zones to favored
or more politically powerful neighborhoods and disadvantage less
politically powerful ones, imposing distributive harms on poor, minority neighborhoods. There is also the risk that patrol officers might
take advantage of the vagueness or plasticity of broad legal standards-"public nuisance," "disorderly conduct," etc.-in ways that
70
allowed them to violate the constitutional rights of citizens. ,
In addition to the above concerns, a system that relies on the
enforcement of uniform regulations or rules is also costly to enforce
and thus contains within it built-in vulnerability to regulatory slippage,
particularly during economically precarious times. What Ellickson
does not grapple with are the conditions under which many cities and
police departments have found themselves in times of limited
resources and high demands on city services, including the cost of
enforcing its own rules and standards. In other words, public oversight (either through a formal zoning system or enforcement of gen64 See id. at 1221-22.
65 Id. at 1221.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 1226.
68 See id. at 1244-46.
69 See id. at 1244-45.
70 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (explaining that a statute
without definite rules is unconstitutionally vague).
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eral standards by public officials) might be the optimal solution for
the unruliness of public spaces, but it can break down terribly under
the weight of the demands put upon it. When the demands on local
government resources outweigh their availability, or when necessary
resource tradeoffs are made in a tough political economy, this can
result in slippage away from regulatory baselines and standards.
Because regulatory slippage often arises where the demand for the
resource far outstrips the government's ability or capacity to exert
effective control over it, the result is often that the sheer volume and
variety of users and uses of a common resource can overwhelm the
ability of a centralized management regime struggling to meet the
needs of a complex urban system.7 1
B. Privatization
Endowing individual users with property rights in the commons
minimizes the incentives for overuse (or exploitation) of the commons and arguably forces users to account for the full social benefits
and costs of their use decisions.7 2 Well-defined property rights can
help the parties to create or mimic some form of Coasian bargaining
in which the parties affected by the externalities will bargain to reach
the optimal level of resource use, or bargain their way around conflicting or rivalrous uses of the common space.7 3 If one believes that a
zoning regime imposes transaction costs too high for the most effi71 See ROSENZWEIG & BLAcKMAR, supra note 7, at 502-03 (explaining that New
York did not have the necessary funds to continue upkeep in the park, yet demand for
the park from users remained high and needs were not met).
72 See Hardin, supranote 14, at 213 ("Under a system of private property the man
or group of men who own property recognize their responsibility to care for it, for if

they don't they will eventually suffer."). But see Bell & Parchomovsky, supranote 3, at
43 (expressing doubt that private property regimes always achieve a full accounting of
costs among property owners and that "generally, some negative externalities of property escape full accounting, creating the need for some external regulatory mechanism such as tort (primarily nuisance) or explicit government regulation"). See
generally Demsetz, supra note 14, at 350 (explaining why individuals internalize costs
when they own property to be consumed); James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons,
Part Two, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325 (1992) (explaining that private property
forces individuals to internalize their costs on the community, as opposed to individuals in a common-property system).
73 In the context of Hardin's original tragedy scenario, this might mean that the
cattle herders each be given a "right to graze," that each would have perfect information about the dollar amount of the harm caused by their individual grazing, and
about the cost to each herder of refraining from grazing. See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a PrivateProperty Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533,
562 (2007). Further, it would mean that "all of those harmed and benefitted by the
[grazing] can be identified and located without cost, that bargaining is costless, and
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cient assignment of property use, then one solution is to provide a
neighborhood unit with the ability to assign rights of entry and 7the
4
discretion to bargain over land use restrictions in common areas.
1. Gated Communities
One of the most extreme private property solutions to urban
commons tragedies is the "gated community," a private residential
development governed by a homeowner's association made up of
7 5 These are typiindividual property owners within the development.
cally new developments located outside of central cities and which are
governed through a system of community-wide covenants and restric76
tions which control common property and other shared amenities.
While each individual person in a gated community individually owns
his or her home, the homeowner's association (constituted by all
homeowners) holds title to all common areas-i.e., to the streets,
parks, sidewalks, etc.
Contemporary gated communities are one response to the tragedy of the urban commons in central cities during periods of regulatory slippage. As Setha Low has argued, the contemporary gated
community is, in large part, a response to political economic transformations of late-twentieth century urban America and the accompanying "breakdown of traditional ways of maintaining social order,"
whereby institutions and mechanisms of social control, such as the
7 7 The gated community became a viapolice, ceased to be effective.
ble and socially acceptable option for residents fleeing central cities
78
that they saw as increasingly violent and crime-ridden. The dramatic
increase in the development of these communities, along with the
that the bargaining process is not marred by collective action problems or strategic
behavior." Id. at 562-63.
74 In other words, neighborhood control over entry to the neighborhood obviates the need for "subsequent users who wish to deviate from the surrounding landuse pattern" to "buy their way in through the political process." Tarlock, supra note
56, at 141; see also Robert H. Nelson, Privatizingthe Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace
Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 827, 828 (1999) (proposing the enactment of "legislation to facilitate the establishment of neighborhood associations in existing neighborhoods").
75 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, ContractingCommunities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829
(describing the homeowner's association system).
76 These are servitudes that run with the land and are binding both on the original homebuyer and also on their successors. See id. at 831-32.
77 See Low, supra note 16, at 86.
78 See SETHA Low, BEHIND THE GATES 111-52 (2003) (discussing fear as a motivating factor for gated communities); Setha Low, The Edge and the Center: Gated Communities and the Discourse of Urban Fear, 103 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45, 45 (2008) (exploring
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continued growth of homeowners associations, has marked a "social
revolution in governance" of the urban commons with private organizations responsible for maintaining residential common areas (including trash collection, security provision, etc.) and where private
enforcement of covenants has replaced municipal oversight in regulating the environment by zoning.79
2.

Private Inner City Neighborhoods

Gated communities are almost exclusively a suburban, or
exurban, phenomenon and, along with neighborhood associations,
arise as part of new developments. However, it is not difficult to imagine a form of gated community being adopted/embraced by an
existing urban community, even one in the middle of a central city.
This is the proposal of Robert Nelson, who advocates for legislation
that will privatize existing urban neighborhoods to enable collective
control over the neighborhood commons.8 0 He models the proposal
on existing homeowners associations, a legal entity that allows property owners in a particular development to hold title to the streets,
parks, neighborhood buildings, and other "common areas" and to
assess fees in order to provide a range of services to residents.8 1 Collective private ownership of the neighborhood commons allows developers to provide common amenities that housing owners demand, but
for which local governments are often reluctant to pay. 82
Nelson's proposal would allow a group of individual property
owners in an existing neighborhood to petition the local or state government to form a private neighborhood association, which the government would then certify based on predetermined standards.8 3 If
how violence and crime legitimize and rationalize "class-based exclusion strategies
and residential segregation").
79 See Low, supra note 16, at 88.
80 See ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LOcAL GOVERNMENT 265-73 (2005); Nelson, supra note 74, at 833; see also Robert C.
Ellickson, New Institutionsfor Old Neighborhoods, 48 DuKE L.J. 75, 77 (1998) (discussing
a similar idea, "Block Level Improvement Districts").
81 These services include garbage collection, street maintenance, snow
removal,
lawn mowing, gardening, and maintenance of the recreational facilities and the common areas of the neighborhood. See Nelson, supra note 74, at 830-31.
82 See id. at 832 ("[T]he fiscal crisis of many local governments in the 197 0s and
1980s meant that these governments were unwilling to accept new responsibilities for
building and maintaining streets, collecting garbage and providing other services.
Providing these services privately, through a neighborhood association, often became
a condition of municipal approval for a new neighborhood.").
83 See id. at 833 ("The petition should describe: (a) the boundaries of the proposed private neighborhood; (b) the instruments of collective governance intended
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the application met the legislative standards, the government would
negotiate an agreement with the neighborhood group, which specifies
the transfer of ownership of municipal streets, parks, swimming pools,
tennis courts, and other existing public lands and facilities located
within the neighborhood, as well as the degree to which the neighborhood private association would assume responsibility for various common services.8 4 Once the agreement is executed and a neighborhood
election held to approve the association, the legal responsibility for
regulating land use in the neighborhood is transferred to the property
owners in the association, and the municipal zoning authority for that
neighborhood is abolished.8 5
3.

The Utilitarian Rationale

Nelson's main argument for privatizing the neighborhood commons, and the zoning function, in existing urban communities rests
largely on a utilitarian rationale-that the collective benefits and
86
maintenance far exceeds the collective costs of such regime. In the
first instance, allowing privatization of the commons would introduce
more innovation and responsiveness from those who most use and
depend upon the resource. 8 7 It would allow a more efficient system of
neighborhood commons management by placing control directly in
the hands of the neighborhood residents, allowing users to more
directly bargain for and purchase improved services necessary to
maintain the commons.88
There are also civic benefits that would flow readily from a privatized commons. The neighborhood association would become a vehicle to "establish and sustain a strong spirit of community in the
neighborhood, not usually found in neighborhoods without a formal
institutional status."8 9 Moreover, engaging property owners in the
for it; (c) the services the neighborhood association would perform; and (d) the estimated monthly assessment.").
84 See id. at 833-34.
85 Except where zoning regulates significant adverse impacts of one neighborhood association on properties located outside of its boundaries. See NELSON, supra
note 80, at 267. This is important because, as Amy Sinden has argued, when an open
access commons is converted into one divided and delineated by property boundaries, the private property boundaries should match (or encompass) the full scope of
externalities or there will be leakage and externalities will remain. See Sinden, supra
note 73, at 555-57.
86 See Nelson, supra note 74, at 835.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 Id. at 836.
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governance of their communities properly incentivizes local control
and increases civic participation by placing decision making in the
hands of local residents, rather than in the clutches of a more distant
government apparatus.9 0 Thus, from a utilitarian perspective, inner
city neighborhoods arguably stand to gain the most in terms of net
increases in the level of neighborhood amenities, aesthetics, and services if residents owned and controlled the neighborhood commons.9 1 When local governments suffer retrenchment in their
resources and control over common areas, it is no surprise that inner
city areas suffer the most decline in neighborhood quality and safety.
4.

The Distributive Justice Rationale

Distributional equity is typically cited as a cost of privatization on
the theory that centralization of public goods better ensures that they
are distributed as equally as economically and politically feasible. Putting control over the provision, access, and maintenance of public
goods in private hands most often results in exclusion and concentration of privilege. Gated communities have become a symbol of the
increased racial and class segregation of urban America, with upper
class (and often nonminority) residents of gated communities cordoning themselves off from what they perceive to be problems that result
from an urban environment that seems unsafe and unruly in its
diversity.92
Nelson, however, views the opportunity to "gate" inner city neighborhoods also as a way to create greater equality between social
classes:
The real inequality may not be the social divisions resulting from
economically and socially segregated patterns of living in the suburbs. The fact that so many people, including people with many
options, chose this style of private living is strong evidence that it
has much to offer. Rather, the greatest inequality may be the denial
of a similar private opportunity to people in the inner city. Many
inner city residents would like to exclude criminals, hoodlums, drug
dealers, truants, and others who often undermine the possibilities
for a peaceful and vital neighborhood existence there.

. .

. There is

no physical or other practical reason why an inner city neighborhood could not become a gated neighborhood. ... [I] t is the poor
who pay a great price in the name of preserving an abstract ideal of
an America undivided by racial, class, or other lines. The rich in
90
91
92

See id. at 876-79.
NELSON, supra note 80, at 304-05.
See Low, supra note 78, at 111-52.

See

2011]

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE URBAN

COMMONS

79

the suburbs, given wider choices, refuse to make a similar
sacrifice.9 3
Nelson also argues that a privatized neighborhood commons is
4
more just because it excludes outsiders from local decisions.9 One
problem with municipal zoning, he argues, is that neighborhoods are
exposed to, or get imposed upon them, actions and decisions that
they do not want.9 5 A privatized scheme ensures governance by those
who have to live with these decisions. So too would inner city property owners net a much larger capital gain when they sold property in
their gated neighborhood.9 6 Improved neighborhood common
amenities will increase the value of properties in the designated neighborhood. The larger these improvements are, the bigger the financial
gain.
5.

Governance Without Ownership

Both Nelson's utilitarian and distributive equity claims assume
that the majority of inner city residents own the property in which
they live. Yet property ownership in many inner city neighborhoods
suffers from an "absentee landlord" syndrome-many residents live in
buildings that are owned by someone else who neither lives in the
community nor expresses much interest in the quality of life of its
residents.9 7 Privatizing these neighborhoods would, in most
instances, turn their governance over to property owners whose interests may or may not align with the majority of neighborhood
residents. To be sure, property owners would not have to enfranchise
non-property owning residents as a matter of law and in fact may lack
powerful enough incentives to do so. Unlike a local government, a
private neighborhood association would not be subject to constitutional constraints such as the one-person, one-vote principle which
would guarantee non-property owning residents a role in the management of their neighborhood. 98
93 Nelson, supra note 74, at 865-66.
94 See id. at 835.
95 See id. ("[U]nder zoning the substantial influence on such matters by outsiders
leaves the neighborhood exposed to regulatory actions that it does not want.").
96 See NELSON, supra note 80, at 305.
97 See generallyJorge 0. Elorza, Absentee Landlords, Rent Control, and Healthy Gentrfication: A Policy Proposal to Deconcentrate the Poor in Urban America, 17 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1 (2007) (delineating the advantages of absentee landlords and the
problems they create).
98 See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 1998)
(rejecting a challenge by non-property owning individuals residing in a Business
Improvement District ("BID") arguing that a governing structure that weighed the

80o

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

87.1

And it is not clear why property owners would want to give up the
power to make neighborhood governance decisions given that they
will bear almost all of the risks and rewards of those decisions on their
financial investment in the neighborhood. 99 There is a real concern
that tenants would be more prone to under-invest in common neighborhood amenities and more likely to opt for easy exit from the
neighborhood when disagreements occur.1 00 In the end, the best that
can be said of an inner city neighborhood privatization scheme which
transfers governance of the neighborhood commons to mostly nonresident property owners is that, despite the potentially significant
democracy deficit in such a scheme, it embraces a kind of subsidiary
that brings governance of the neighborhood a little closer to the people who reside there. Those closest to the resource, and most dependent upon it, arguably have the greatest incentive to take care of and
manage it.101 Bell and Parmochovsky's "antiproperty easement"
scheme, in which neighboring property owners (in their case, owners
abutting a public park) are vested with a formal, but limited, legal
entitlement to enjoin certain activities in a commons space, is a less
intrusive means to achieve some control by property owners over the
neighborhood commons. 10 2
Nelson's proposal very much suffers from a principal-agent problem that fails to adequately equip nonresident property owners with
the necessary tools or incentives to effectively solve or govern on-theground neighborhood commons problems. One answer to this is that
a private neighborhood association formed by property owners might
be incentivized to enfranchise non-property owning residents in the
votes of property owners more heavily than residents violated the constitutional guarantee of "one person, one vote").
99 See Ellickson, supra note 80, at 92 ("Both theory and evidence indicate that
most of the benefits of a localized public good redound to the owners of real estate
located within the benefitted territory."); see alsoJonathan B.Justice & Robert S. Goldsmith, PrivateGovernments or Public Policy Tools? The Law and Public Policy of NewJersey's
Special Improvement Districts, 29 INT'LJ. PUB. ADMIN. 107, 109 (2006) (arguing that BIDs
better protect the long-term interest of an area, as opposed to the short-term interest
of temporary tenants).
100 See Ellickson, supra note 80, at 93-94 (listing various reasons why giving the
power to control a Block Improvement District ("BLID") to property owners is more
desirable than giving it to tenants).
101 See Ellickson, supra note 11, at 1197 ("Landlords and tenants of street-level
properties tend to be especially attentive because the external benefits of greater
street civility are capitalized into the value of their assets.").
102 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 32-34 (explaining that adjacent
property owners would operate like "public guardians" of the park and have the legal
right to enjoin further development in the park as a means of conserving the park, for
the benefit not only of the easement holders, but also the public at large).
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neighborhood by giving them seats on the association's governing
board or a vote in electing property-owning board members. Much
like New Governance proponents recognize, private property owners
might be inclined to see value in creating opportunities for networks
of local stakeholders-e.g., residents-to collaborate and cooperate
toward common goals. 0 3 However, given the barriers to meaningful
participation for inner city residents under conditions of social conflict and economic hardship, it is difficult to imagine how previously
unaligned interests would cooperate to create and implement shared/
common goals in the way that New Governance theorists envision. 10 4
C.

Collective Management

The choice between private property rights and government
coercion in managing common resources is built upon a core assumption: that collective action, involving a group of individuals working to
further their common interests, is unlikely in light of the free rider
problem. 0 5 Hardin's famous tale has been subject to critique in part
because it assumes a rational actor model in which each individual is
concerned with maximizing his or her own gains in the commons. 0 6
Elinor Ostrom, for example, has questioned this assumption by citing
examples of self-organized, cooperative management of small-scale
natural or man-made resources (such as fisheries, uncultivated lands,
communal forests, groundwater basins, and irrigation systems) where
103 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fallof Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 378 (2004) ("Collaboration ...
promotes mutual accountability, defined as 'accountability among autonomous actors
committed to shared values and visions and to relationships of mutual trust and influence that enable renegotiating expectations and capacities to respond to uncertainty
and change.'" (quoting L. David Brown, Multiparty Social Action and Mutual Accountability, in GLOBAL ACCoUNTABTLIIEs 89 (Alnoor Ebrahim & Edward Weisband eds.,
2007))).
104 See Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participationin New Governance: Lessons from
Chicago's Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERT L. & POL'Y 117,
184-85 (2009) (analyzing new governance theory in practice in the context of reform
of the Hope VI housing project in Chicago and finding that it was difficult for public
housing residents to meaningfully participate in the reform process in the absence of
rights-bearing rules, formal rights to participation, and judicial supervision or administrative recourse).
105 This assumption is based on the work of Mancur Olson, Jr. See MANCUR
OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcTION 2 (1965) ("[U]nless there is coercion
or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest,

rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interests." (emphasis omitted)).
106 See generally Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244 (asserting that humans act selfishly
and exhaust resources in common-property areas).
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users devise and enforce their own rules in the absence of government
coercion or endowment of property rights in the resource. 0 7 Her
work, more than any other scholar, has overturned the assumption
that free riding would reign in a commons given the tendency toward
individual self-interest. Instead, she has demonstrated that many
social groups have struggled successfully against threats of resource
degradation by developing and maintaining self-governing
institutions. 108
Similar research by Robert Ellickson has highlighted the ability of
small, or "close-knit," communities to solve disputes over resource and
land use through a system of informal social norms. His study of
ranchers and landowners in Shasta County, California found that, in
spite of a well-developed system of legal rules that governed straying
cattle and land disputes, the community had developed its own system
of informal norms governing disputes and that the system was selfreinforcing. 0 9 His findings further support the idea that, at least in
small, fairly homogenous communities, the existence of strong cooperative norms allows communities to govern themselves in the face of
conflict without the aid of the state or other central coordinator.110
There has been no analogous study of the possibility of collective
action in managing resource disputes in public urban spaces. To the
extent that scholars have focused on this question in the urban context, they have been quite skeptical of the capacity of urban communities for what they call "collective efficacy.""' This skepticism is at its
highest when there exists social disorder in urban communities, particularly in public spaces. Where this social disorder exists, these
scholars laud the presence, and even coercion, of public authorities as
a necessary means of helping to re-instill good social norms in the

107 See OSTROM, supra note 5, at 18-21.
108 See id.; see also Thomas Dietz et al., The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 Sci.
1907, 1910 (2003) (demonstrating that the "tragedy of the commons" is not inevitable
whenever land is an open resource, rather, many governance systems exist that effectively manage resources).
109 See ELLICKSON, supra note 18, at 15-64.
110 See id. at 167-69; see alsojed S. Ela, Law and Norms in Collective Action: Maximizing Social Influence to Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27 UCLAJ. ENvrL L. & POL'Y 93, 114
(2009) (discussing Ellickson's work and noting that other ethnographic research has
documented cooperative norms among close-knit groups as diverse as lobster fishermen, diamond merchants, and molecular biologists).
111 SeeYili Xu et al., Discoveringthe Impact of Community Policing: The Broken Windows
Thesis, Collective Efficacy, and Citizens'Judgment, 42 J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 147, 147
(2005).
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This section calls attention to the role of the state, or local government, in relationship to collective action. The general assumption
is that collective action occurs beyond the shadow of legal rules or
government coercion,1 1 3 and without the support of a private property rights system. As such, much of the scholarly literature on collective action has highlighted informal rule making, enforcement, and
monitoring within communities.11 4 This endogenous focus tends to
obscure the important role that central government authorities can
and do play in both enabling and sustaining collective action over
time. This state role can be a particularly important, and even unavoidable, aspect of the ability of users to collectively manage urban
common resources. This is at least in part because the urban "commons" is regulated by the local government and, in spite of regulatory
slippage, the local government retains its formal ownership and regulatory control of the resource. As such, it would be difficult for users
to sustain cooperative management of a common urban resource over
time without some enabling from the state or local government.
1. Cooperative Management of Natural Resources
Elinor Ostrom found that many tribal groups, villages, and other
local communities have long histories of effective collective action,
including in situations where they lacked any formal mechanisms to
control individual behaviors through a system of property rights or
government regulation.1 15 Ostrom's study focused on small-scale
resources-what she called "common pool resources"' 1 6-affecting a
relatively small number of persons (50 to 15,000) who are heavily
dependent on the resource for economic returns.11 7 In these situa112 See id.
113 See ELLICKSON, supranote 18, at 52-53, 72-76 (explaining how community selfgovernance not conducted "in the shadow of the law" and how ranchers hold each
other responsible for straying cattle regardless of whether the formal legal rule mandates compensation).
114 See Robert Sampson, Neighbourhood and Community: Collective Efficacy and Community Safety, NEW ECON., 2004, at 108 (noting that collective efficacy depends on
"walking trust" and "social interaction," and does not require a friendly relationship

with authorities).
115 See OSTROM, supra note 5, at 61-68.
116 This refers to a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large
as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from
obtaining benefits from its use. See id. at 30.
117 See id. at 26.
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tions, individuals exist in an interdependent relationship, with each
other and the resource, and are strongly motivated to try to solve common problems to enhance their productivity over time. Ostrom identified a number of these self-organized resource governance regimes
that have survived for multiple generations where the participants
invest resources in monitoring the actions of each other and enforcing internal norms so as to reduce the probability of free-riding. 118
Collective action in these communities is particularly successful
where there exists a resource with clearly defined boundaries and a
community with stable membership and a homogenous culture, who
also share beliefs, a history, or expectation of continued interaction
and reciprocity.11 9 In actual field settings where these conditions are
present, Ostrom found that communities were able to develop and
enforce rules, as well as conflict resolution procedures, that govern
the use of the resource. 120 These rules and procedures were recognized as legitimate by the government, which made them easier to
monitor and enforce.
Many of Ostrom's cases studies document the existence of wholly
endogenous solutions to natural resources management. 1 2' That is,
these groups successfully established and enforced their own rules
without resort to external public agencies. 2 2 In other cases, however,
users were able to enforce and monitor their rules only with the help
of external agencies on whom they relied in instituting a complex,
nested public-private governance system to regulate the resource.12 3
118 See id. at 65-69 (describing common lands governed by local village communities in Japan); id. at 82-88 (discussing irrigation communities in Philippines); id. at
144-78 (describing examples of some fisheries and irrigation projects able to manage
communally).
119 See id. at 88-91; see also Sara Singleton & Michael Taylor, Common Property, Collective Action and Community, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 309, 309-15 (1992) (finding that a
group possesses the capacities for a wholly endogenous solution to the tragedy of
commons to the degree it approximates a community of mutually vulnerable actors).
120 This was particularly true where users had the opportunity to participate in
rule making and governance. See OSTROM, supra note 5, at 90; see also Elinor Ostrom,
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 149-53 (2000)
(describing how collective action and monitoring problems are solved in a reinforcing manner when users of resources design their own rules that are enforced by local
users or accountable to them, using graduated sanctions, that define who has rights to
withdraw from the resources, and that effectively assign costs proportionate to
benefits.).
121 See OSTROM, supra note 5, at 61-68.
122 See id.
123 See id. at 101-02; see also ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL
DrvERSIrY 11-13 (2005) (discussing the many layers of internal processing that results
in decision making)

2011]

In

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND

THE URBAN

COMMONS

85

contrast to self-managed community resource use systems that

operate mainly with social sanctions, resources that traverse many
communities and user groups may require more complex institutional
structures, often involving government coordination and
enforcement. 1 24
Ostrom's study of a series of groundwater basins located beneath
12 5 In her
the Los Angeles metropolitan area illustrates this point.
findings, groundwater producers organized voluntary associations,
negotiated settlements of water rights, and created special water districts to monitor and enforce those rights with the assistance of county
and state authorities.12 6 State legislation authorizing the creation of
special water districts by local citizens, in particular, was a crucial element in encouraging users of groundwater basins to invest in selforganization and the supply of a local institution. 2 7 Once a special
28
Those
district was created, it possessed a wide variety of powers.'
powers included the ability to raise revenue through a water pump tax
and, to a limited extent through a property tax, to undertake collective actions to replenish a groundwater basin.12 9 Without such legislation, a similar set of users facing similar collective action challenges
might not be able to supply themselves with transformed
"microinstitutions." 3 0

124

See ELINOR

OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES

326

(1994) ("Individuals in relatively simple systems are apt to develop rules more nearly
optimal than individuals in more complex systems, especially systems involving substantial asymmetries of interest.").
125 See OSTROM, supra note 5, at 103-42 (discussing the case studies of user groups
in three California groundwater basins).
126 See id. at 133-36.
127 See id. at 129, 133-34, 139 (noting that the special districts were created by
users to tax themselves and then to use those funds to undertake collective actions to
replenish a groundwater basin).
128 See id. at 129.
129 See id.
130 The special district, though central to the relationship among users, was only
one public enterprise among a half dozen agencies that were actively involved in the
management of the basins. In addition to the public districts, private water associations were also active in each groundwater basin. Ostrom viewed the relationship
between the private water associations, public agencies, and special districts as illustrating how a governance system "can evolve to remain largely in the public sector
without being a central regulator." Id. at 135. The basins became managed as a
"polycentric" public-enterprise system that is neither centrally owned nor centrally
regulated. Id. at 135-36.

86

2.

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

87.1

Collective Efficacy, Social Disorder, and Urban Self-Governance

While scholars have not charted the existence of self-organized
groups in the urban context, they have identified the potential for
urban communities to do so under certain conditions. Specifically,
social scientists have emphasized the importance of "collective efficacy" in (re)instituting and maintaining healthy and safe communities.13 1 Collective efficacy exists where there is the social cohesion,
working trust, and a shared willingness of residents to intervene on
behalf of the common good, including to maintain effective social
controls in the community.13 2 A neighborhood or group's capacity
for action thus depends on a certain level of social capital, as well as
on informally shared expectations or norms for cooperative action.1 33
However, strong social ties and dense social networks alone are not
enough for collective efficacy to be present. Rather, those ties and
networks have to be "activated" through actual engagement that
enables residents to exert more effective informal social control on
each other. 13 4
A lack of collective efficacy is highly correlated with the existence
of social disorder in public spaces, enforced by violence or threats of
violence.13 5 Violence in particular (or the fear of it) can prevent or
impede the development of productive social norms and the collective efficacy necessary for neighbors to maintain effective social controls in their community. 3 6 Communities that have high levels of
131 See Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighbourhoodsand Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study
of Collective Efficacy, 277 Sci. 918, 918 (1997) (finding that a community's ability to
exercise informal control and its collective capacity for action directly predicts lower
rates of violence).
132 See Sampson, supra note 114, at 108.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See NICOLE STELLE GARNErr, ORDERING THE CIY 55 (2010) (charting a fourcategory taxonomy of disorder in urban communities and explaining that social disorder usually "describes the disfavored behaviors thought to signal a breakdown in
healthy social norms in struggling communities" and noting some of these social disorders, such as prostitution and drug trafficking, are also crimes); Sampson et al.,
supra note 131, at 918 (controlling for a wide range of individual and neighborhood
characteristics, including poverty and the density of friendship ties, collective efficacy
directly predicts lower rates of violence).
136 See Sampson et al., supra note 131, at 918; Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W.
Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in
Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. Soc. 603, 637-38 (1999); see also Dan Kahan, Social
Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 387 (1997) ("[H]ighly
visible private precautions might in fact erode deterrence by emboldening law-breakers and demoralizing law-abiders."); Tracey L. Meares, Prayingfor Community Policing,
90 CALIF. L. REv. 1593, 1604 (2002) ("Whether infrastructure supports a community's
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social disorder are assumed to lack the capacity for collective action
that would enable them to (re)establish and maintain order in their
communities. 3 7 Where social disorder prevails, more aggressive public intervention can provide an "exogenous shock" to re-establish positive social norms of conduct.'3 8 In communities with high levels of
social capital and social order, however, public intervention is pre1 39
sumed to be unnecessary given the capacity for self-governance.
Scholars have cited a number of ways that local governments, in
particular, can bolster collective efficacy in communities beset by
social disorder. These include shoring up social capital through programs designed to attract and retain residents likely to purchase
140 The move
homes and put down roots in their neighborhoods.
toward community policing is another example of the kind of local
government effort that scholars have found can "kick-start" or "reinvigorate" collective efficacy in neighborhoods with high levels of disorder and little possibility of self-governance.1 4 1 Community policing
practices seek to change prevailing norms of public-space allocation
"in part by asking police officers to suppress 'bad' norms and enforce
'good' norms."142
efforts to resist crime will depend on the kinds of norms transmitted among individuals who live in a neighborhood."); James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, at 31 ("[U]ntended behavior ... leads to the breakdown
of community controls." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
137 Cf GARNETr, supra note 135, at 136 (arguing that low levels of social capital
deprive communities of the ability to effectively organize); Sampson & Raudenbush,
supra note 136, at 637 (stating that the data supports the theory that social disorder
coincides with lowered collective efficacy).
138 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 1,
23-26 (2001).
139 See GARNETr, supra note 135, at 136 ("[I]t is clear that the healthiest, safest
urban communities enjoy high levels of collective efficacy without public
intervention.").
140 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable PrivateEducation and the Middle Class City, 77
U. CHI. L. REv. 201, 209-10 (2010) (noting the findings that collective efficacy
increases along with residential tenure and homeownership).
141 See GARNETT, supra note 135, at 136; see also Dan M. Kahan, PrivatizingCriminal
Law: Strategiesfor Private Norm Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1865
(1999) (explaining how prayer vigils organized by the police and churches on the
south side of Chicago acted as a "visible display of community solidarity against
crime"); Tracey L. Meares, Prayingfor Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1593,
1604-08 (2002) (noting the effectiveness of community-wide action); Tracey L.
Meares & Kelsi Brown Corkran, Wen 2 or 3 Come Together, 48 Wm. & MARY L. REV.
1315, 1334-35 (2007) (recounting the prayer vigils).
142 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, PrivateNorms and Public Spaces, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 183, 184 (2009).
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Nicole Garnett has argued that community policing programs situate police officers as both "norm-entrepreneurs" and "norm-enforcers."143 Police officers act as norm-entrepreneurs when they assert
themselves in the community to suppress bad group norms and/or to
establish normatively superior group norms. 1 4 4 The police practice of
"assertive vigilance" is cited as an example of norm entrepreneurship
by police; this practice can mean that police work with local leaders to
organize marches in high crime areas, prayer vigils at the sight of
gang- or drug-related shootings, barbeque picnics in drug market
areas, and positive loitering campaigns in areas frequented by prostitutes. 145 Police act as "norm-enforcers" in communities by soliciting
information about, and then enforcing, informal community
norms.146 The result is that police shift their patrol and enforcement
priorities to pay more attention to the types of disorders identified by
the community.14 7 The effect of public intervention is not simply to
reestablish superior social norms but also to re-allocate public space in
urban communities. 148
3.

Cooperation and the State

As Ostrom argued, the effort by user groups to create new institutions for resource governance is a second order collective action
dilemma.'4 9 Much of the literature heralding self-management
regimes have focused on the endogenous variables embedded in common resource management regimes. 50 That is, many commentators
stress how self-governing communities are very dependent on the size
and knittedness of the community and the existence of shared norms
143 See id. at 189-90.
144 See id. at 184, 193-94.
145 See id. at 190, 194; see also Kahan, supra note 141, at 1865 (explaining how
prayer vigils "enervate the norms that fuel gang membership").
146 See Garnett, supra note 142, at 192.
147 See id.
148 See id. at 194-96.
149 See OSTROM, supranote 5, at 136. As she points out, resource users must invest
tremendous resources to design institutional arrangements that incorporate the new
processes and rules that will govern the resource. See id. at 136-37 (noting that her
case studies do not bear out the assumption that individuals caught up in a rivalry for
extraction of resources would refrain from expending resources to design, negotiate,
and supply new institutions).
150 Although it should be noted that in a later work, Ostrom refers to some attributes of the user community as an "exogenous" variable. See OSTROM, supra note 123,
at 13-15.
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and social capital among resource users.15 1 A small homogenous
community is thus more likely to succeed at managing a commons
than a larger and more diffuse one, for example.15 2 Far less attention
has been paid to the role of central governments in creating and sustaining these regimes. Yet, Ostrom's own work, as well as the work of
others, suggests that central governments can play a significant role in
supporting, and potentially lowering the costs involved in, the creation of these institutions without subsuming them into a centralized
governance regime.15 3
The free rider problem, as well as the high transaction costs and
potential fragility of collective action efforts, means that the government is not necessarily an irrelevant actor in groups' ability to endogenously manage a common resource. 154 These transaction costs
include, among others, search costs (identifying the possibilities for
pareto-optimal mutual gains), bargaining costs (negotiating an agreement to take action toward one or more of those gains), and enforcement costs (monitoring and enforcing the agreement) .155 As scholars
like Ann Carlson and Michael Vandenbergh have pointed out, these
costs are particularly difficult to overcome in situations dealing with
large-scale commons problems-e.g., individual recycling and carbon
emissions reductions-which require a large number of diffuse individuals to engage in small or modest actions to effect what might
appear to be small (or even initially negative) payoffs for the commons. 15 6 Overcoming large-number, small (or initially negative) pay151 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 18, at 15-40, 177-82 (suggesting that normbased self-governance works best in "close-knit groups"); Ellickson, supra note 80, at
83 (noting that informal social networks and a high level of solidarity are helpful
when creating a Block Level Improvement District); Grimmelmann, supra note 51, at
2808-09 (noting that community cohesion and size are the factors that stand out as
essential to the success of a cooperatively managed commons regime).
152 See Ellickson, supra note 80, at 83 (discussing how smallness and homogeneity
are key elements of ability to cooperatively manage neighborhood and block level
amenities); Grimmelmann, supra note 51 at 2809 ("The bigger the group, the greater
the tendency towards ruin.").
153 SeeOSTROM, supra note 5, at 139 ("[T]he difference between an active effort by
a central government to regulate appropriation and provision activities and an effort
to provide arenas and rules for microinstitutional change is frequently blurred.").
154 See OSTROM, supra note 5, at 40 ("The costs involved in transforming a situation from one in which individuals act independently to one in which they coordinate
activities can be quite high."); Grimmelmann, supra note 51, at 2809 (noting that
"strong and well-defined communities will be able to sustain the constant work of selfcontrol required" of cooperatively managed commons regimes).
155 See Singleton & Taylor, supra note 119, at 319.
156 SeeAnn E. Carlson, Recycling Nonns, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1244 (2001); Michael
Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How PersonalNorm Activation Can Protect the
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off collective action problems proves very difficult from a policymaking perspective. 15 7 This is in part because, even with the existence of
strong social norms, government intervention is often necessary to
incentivize norm activation and to make collective action less costly to
undertake.15 8
For smaller scale, higher payoff collective action problems, like
managing a discrete geographic common resource, the incentive
structure is much simpler. Government support can reduce the costs
of cooperation and help the actors to leverage their efforts to achieve
high economic and social payoffs from their collective action. For
example, the institution of "architectural changes" by government can
induce the desired collective action, particularly where such action is
relatively inconvenient or requires significant individual efforts.15 9
These architectural changes might include regulatory mechanisms,
which remove barriers to cooperation or make it more beneficial or
convenient for individuals to engage in cooperative behavior. 6 0
Government support can also help stabilize groups who are able
to initially cooperate but may face endogenous (and exogenous)
threats over time. The existence of strong social ties and social norms,
for example, may be hard to sustain over the long run without government support. Among the threats to even small, tight-knit groups are
the disruption of trust and community stability that come with high
levels of in- and out- migration.1s6 So too can subtle changes in future
Environment, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1101, 1102, 1164 (explaining how individuals can
struggle to accept that a diffuse, ubiquitous problem like climate change can be mitigated through such a seemingly insignificant action as flicking off one's light switch);
see also Hope M. Babcock, Assuming PersonalResponsibilityfor Improving the Environment:
Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 117, 140 (2009)
("[W]hen second generation environmental harms are at issue, it is extremely difficult to 'conceptualize individual behavior as a distinct source of social problems."'
(quoting Vandenbergh, supra, at 1164)).
157 See Carlson, supra note 156, at 1241-45 (describing the challenges presented
for policymakers seeking to enforce recycling).
158 See id. at 1264-66 (discussing the importance of government assistance in creating and sustaining recycling norms and behavior); Vandenbergh, supra note 156, at
1105-06 (noting the interplay between social norms and government intervention).
159 See Carlson, supra note 156, at 1231-32 (noting that "norm creation or management is by itself not likely to be terribly effective" in resolving larger scale environmental problems).
160 See id. at 1265-67.
161 See Ostrom, supra note 120, at 153 ("Since collective action is largely based on
mutual trust, some self-organized resource regimes that are in areas of rapid settlement have disintegrated within relatively short times."); id. (listing a number of other
threats identified in the empirical literature). Other researchers have also identified
migration in and out of communities as detrimental to social capital. See generally
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pay-offs, the costs of individual defections, shifts or modifications in
the rule of cooperation, and other group dynamics which may bring
about preference changes and reorientation of values within the
group.16 2
The supportive or enabling role of government in the collective
management of common urban resources is unavoidable on some
level. The urban "commons" is regulated by the local government,
which typically retains regulatory control and proprietary ownership
of the resource. Although private actors are motivated to act on
behalf of preserving the commons under conditions of regulatory slippage-i.e., when government authorities are either unable or unwilling to-they are not completely free to do so. What we will see in the
next Part is that collective management of common urban resources
occurs not just in the shadow of the state, but very much dependent
on some level for state (or local government) support. How much
dependence on government there is, however, will depend on the
strength of the endogenous variables mentioned above. The next
chapter will posit that there is a strong correlation in the urban context between the endogenous variables that can shape and strengthen
collective action and the level of government support associated with
the new management regime.
III.

COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE URBAN COMMONS

If we were to ask the same question that Ostrom and others have
asked in their work-whether there are groups of resource users able
to cooperate together, allocate shared resources, and obtain joint benefits from the resource when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk or
otherwise act opportunistically 63-the clear answer is yes. The ability
of collective commons management regimes to remain stable and
endure over time can be very much dependent on community size
and knittedness, community makeup, stability of community membership, resource scale, and shared social norms/social capital. However,
Manual Pastor,Jr. et al., Which Came First?Toxic Facilities,Minority Move-In, and EnvironmentalJustice, 23J. URB. AFF. 1 (2001) (hypothesizing that "ethnic churning"-changing demographic conditions-weakens the bonds between residents in a community
and thus weakens political power, makes community mobilization more difficult, and
increases susceptibility to siting hazardous facilities).
162 See Pranab Bardhan, Symposium on Management of Local Commons, 7 J. ECON.
PERSP. 87, 89-90 (1993) (noting for example, "[c]ontact with outsiders and the
option to exit reduce the effectiveness of social norms" in small groups and
"[p]rolonged repetition of the game also becomes more uncertain in a mobile world,

raising incentives for short-run opportunism").
163 See OSTROM, supra note 5, at 29.

92

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 87f:1

these endogenous factors tell only part of the story. As the examples
below will illustrate, there is much more variability in how these factors play out in the urban context.
Collective management of urban resources does not occur only
in small, homogenous, close-knit communities with stable membership. Many large-scale resources are in fact being cooperatively managed by groups of heterogeneous, and sometimes transient, users who
access the resource for different purposes. Moreover, in contrast to
the assumptions of urban scholars, the presence of social disorder
does not strongly correlate with a lack of positive social norms, social
capital, and collective efficacy in user groups and communities. Even
where social disorder exists in public spaces, we see communities
come together to develop and enforce a new set of norms and practices in that space to replace the social disorder that had existed. That
is, users themselves become positive norm entrepreneurs even in contexts where there exists a fairly high level of social disorder.
What I want to highlight, however, is the relationship between
the endogenous factors that drive many forms of cooperative resource
management and the role of the state or local government. My key
insight is the following. There is an inverse relationship between
those endogenous variables and a strong central government role in
supporting a collective resource management regime. What we will
see in the following examples is the greater ability of smaller, more
homogenous (and perhaps more tight-knit) user groups to cooperatively manage a discrete neighborhood resource in the absence of a
strong governmental role. On the other hand, we will see a much
stronger government role where there exists an increase in the scale
and complexity of the resource. This is particularly so, as in the case
of larger scale resources, where resource users are more heterogeneous, transient, and lack a high level of social cohesion. As the examples in this Part illustrate, as the presence of endogenous factors
decrease, the government's role tends to increase and is much more
embedded in the ability of the collectivity to sustain itself over time.
Conversely, where endogeneity is strongest, the government role is at
its most minimal.
The examples below are thus arranged to demonstrate that collective action enabling exists along somewhat of a spectrum. On one
end of the spectrum are examples of largely endogenous collective
efforts involving de minimis government enabling. In the first two
examples, community gardens and park "friends" groups, the support
provided by the government simply allows, either explicitly or implicitly, the collective to exercise management prerogatives over the
resource. It does so by not interfering in the group effort or by pro-
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viding consent to engage in efforts on behalf of the resource. The
government has virtually no affirmative role in coordinating the collective effort or in establishing the group, although it may provide
them with financial or other incentives to sustain their efforts.
In the middle of the spectrum there is a more significant government role in supporting the collectivity or group to sustain itself,
although the government has virtually no role in enabling the formation of the collectivity which is largely an endogenous effort. However, there can be a closer relationship between the government and
the collectivity in which the government shares its resources with the
group and exercises some degree of oversight of the group's activities.
Neighborhood foot patrols and, more specifically, the Guardian
Angels are an example of groups existing in the middle of the spectrum of government enabling. Government enabling is an important
stabilizing force for the group and the group works closely with government officials. However, the relationship between the government
and the group falls short of a fully realized partnership.
On the other end of the spectrum are collective efforts that are
very much dependent on the government to coordinate, establish,
and sustain themselves. That is, the group takes its form only as a
result of government support and entanglement. Which is to say: government support is a precondition to the existence of the collectivity.
In these latter examples-park conservancies and business improvement districts-the support provided by the government is an essential element in the existence of the collectivity and the government is
an indispensible partner or participant in the ongoing collective effort
(including collecting or sharing the revenue that sustains the group).
In the case of park conservancies, government support takes the form
of a formal partnership in which the collectivity and local government
co-manage the resource. In the case of "BIDs," it is the passage of
special legislation that creates the structure of the BID and defines
and formalizes the contours of BIDs' responsibilities over the shared
resources within their districts.
A.

Community Gardens

Consider the widespread creation and management of community gardens by local residents in many central cities across the country.16 4 These gardens are created on vacant urban lots in the midst of
economically and socially fragile communities. Many of these lots
164 The following account is based on a previous article. See Sheila R. Foster, The
City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAM L. REV.
527, 534-43 (2006).
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were left vacant by the demolition of buildings abandoned by their
original owners, or cleared but not redeveloped in the wake of
defunct urban renewal programs, and whose ownership was assumed
by the city through tax foreclosure.' 65 These lots had often become
"rivalrous" spaces-overrun by drug users, car strippers, and illegal
dumpers of all kinds of waste-and thus became safe havens for a host
of criminal and other illicit activities.' 6 6
Coalitions and networks of local residents in cities across the
country have come together to clear these vacant lots of trash and
drug paraphernalia, and to plant and cultivate trees, flowers, and vegetables. Transformation of the space from a barren, degraded one to
an aesthetically pleasing green one provides increased public surveillance through an increase in "defensible space"-areas in which
"escape routes for criminal perpetrators are limited and public range
of vision is maximized to prevent illicit conduct."16 7 In addition to
offering infrastructure for community recreation and interaction
(e.g., benches, playgrounds, water ponds and fountains, summerhouses, etc.), the gardens also provide a local source of fresh vegetables in neighborhoods often lacking these resources.' 6 8
The transformation of these small spaces into productive land
uses-community gardens-is a largely endogenous effort. Local
residents manage to come together, construct and maintain these
fully functioning gardens in the absence of government coercion or
intervention, or the divestment of property rights in the lots/gardens.16 9 Reclaiming and preserving the gardens instead depends
upon, and fosters, collaborative relationships and social ties among
neighborhood residents who see their quality of life and the future of
165 Many of these lots are city-owned, while others are on the brink of being cityowned because of outstanding municipal tax liens against them. See id. at 534.
166 See Antonio Alves et al., Environmentalism in the Dudley Street Neighborhood, 14 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 735, 737 (1995) ("[O]ver a thousand such lots [in the Boston neighborhood] are now overrun with candy wrappers, beer bottles, hypodermic needles, fuel
oil tanks, tires, refrigerators, and construction debris. These lots also serve as sites for
drug dealing, car stripping, and illegal dumping of solid and hazardous waste.").
167 Jane E. Schukoske, Community Development Through Gardening: State and Local
Policies Transforming Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 351, 356 (2000).
The gardeners become the "eyes and ears" of the community, resulting in sometimes
dramatic reductions in crime in the host neighborhood. See id. at 356-59.
168 See id. at 359-60 (noting that the production of fresh produce by community
gardens is at least "partial relief to the problem of substandard grocery stores, which
often operate in low-income urban neighborhoods where a lack of transportation limits consumer options").
169 See generally supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (explaining how no
exogenous forces were required to spur the cultivation of these gardens).
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their neighborhoods deeply implicated by these barren spaces.17 0
This social capital, and the norms that they generate, enable residents
to cooperatively work toward common neighborhood goals and create
a sense of control over their space. Without this mutual cooperation,
many of these open, vacant lots would likely have remained blighted
and dangerous, threatening the economic and social health of the
community.
The creation of these gardens in predominantly low-income
neighborhoods, often with high levels of social disorder, renders
problematic the widespread assumption that such neighborhoods suffer from weak social capital and are incapable of "collective efficacy."1 71 It also undermines any assumption that government
officials, such as police officers, are necessary for "norm-entrepreneurship" in communities or in common spaces beset by social disorder.
Instead, what we see at work is just the opposite. Neighborhood
residents themselves become norm-entrepreneurs. Their actions
transform not just the physical space but also the norms and behavior
that govern that space. And they do so without the "exogenous shock"
of aggressive state or local government intervention to manage the
space. 172
To be sure, the lots have been transformed into community gardens with the implicit, and often explicit, consent of the local government. Local governments provide long-term, renewable leases of
these city-owned lots to community gardeners for a nominal fee.1 73
Other forms of support include the provision of small grants, technical support, and gardening tools. 1 74 The provision of even modest
financial incentives or subsidies to collectivities like community gar170 Continuing and multiple interactions among members of the group both
increase the likelihood and the ability to find cooperative solutions and overcome the
fear of free riding. See Foster, supra note 164, at 541.
171 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
173 See Karl Linn, Reclaiming the Sacred Commons, 1 NEw VILLAGE J. 1999, at 44,
available at http://www.newvillage.net/Journal/Issuel/ 1sacredcommon.htm (noting
that many cities have made land available to communities via short-term leases). In
this sense, however, the gardens remain vulnerable to extinction if and when a city
decides to revoke this consent and reclaim the gardens for another purpose or land
use. See Foster, supra note 164, at 535-38 (recounting the dispute between New York
City and community gardeners when then Mayor Giuliani threatened to auction off
some of the gardens to private housing developers).
174 See GreenThumb Community Gardens, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF PARKs & RECREATION,
http://www.nycgovparks.org/sub-about/partners/greenthumb/greenthumb.html
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (discussing the nation's largest urban gardening program
providing members with technical support and materials).
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deners or local park groups helps to reduce some of the high transaction costs that they may be facing in pooling their resources to
transform decrepit vacant lots or degraded parks space into productive spaces. For community gardeners, their efforts would be quite
costly if they had to purchase or rent the lots at market rates. This
support helps to sustain the work of the collectivity, no doubt, but it is
not inducement enough to bring the actors together in the first place.
Thus, although local government support is present, it is de minimis
support, enabling the group continue using the space and to sustain
its gardening efforts.
B.

Neighborhood Park Friends" Groups

Much like the vacant urban lots on which community gardens
have been constructed, many urban parks-large and small-became
empty havens for illicit or illegal activity during periods of reduced
oversight and management by local governments. Central Park in
New York City is the classic example of this. In the 1970s and 1980s, a
steep decline in city appropriations for parks devastated the entire
urban park system, leaving many parks and recreational areas unsafe,
dirty, prone to criminal activity, and virtually abandoned by most
users.' 75 The story of this historic park is mirrored to a smaller extent
in neighborhood parks in many urban cities across the country. 7 6
The emergence of neighborhood parks' "friends" groups to revitalize
and maintain urban parks in the 1980s and 1990s is a direct response
to this regulatory slippage.17 7 Like community gardeners, residents
who live near these parks, or are otherwise invested in their upkeep,
mobilize to plan and raise support for their restoration, maintenance,
and preservation. Throughout the country, there are hundreds (if
not thousands) of these groups that have revitalized neighborhood
public parks and filled the void left by the loss of most of their public
175 See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 7, at 502 ("More than five hundred
parks and playgrounds received only weekly cleaning from mobile task forces. In the
absence of regular maintenance, supervision, or policing, many parks and playgrounds suffered vandalism and were filled with piles of garbage. Even after the city's
financial plight eased three years later, the parks continued to decay.").
176 See Murray, supra note 9, at 230 (recounting the history of Bryant Park in
which poor park design which limited visibility and poor lighting combined with
insufficient municipal funding for maintenance and security rendered the park
unsafe and underutilized).
177 See KATHY MADDEN ET AL., PUBLIC PARKS, PRIVATE PARKS 13-22 (2000); see also
DORCETA E. TAYLOR, THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE PEOPLE IN AMERICAN CITIES,
1600s-1900s 346-47 (2009) (explaining how "after decades of neglect," citizens
began to notice the parks' "state of disrepair," causing conservations groups to act).
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operating funds and active local government management.1 78 Many
of these groups remain an informal collection of volunteers, while
others have become more formal. The more formal groups establish
themselves as a membership organization, elect board of directors,
write bylaws, and apply for nonprofit status.17 9
Groups that form to revitalize and manage neighborhood urban
parks, typically "Friends of [Park X]," are largely endogenous efforts
undertaken by abutting park neighbors or frequent users who lend
their time, give money, or help raise funds to recover and maintain
the park. These groups consist of volunteers who provide labor for
park maintenance and assist in community outreach and park programming.1 8 0 They organize park cleanups and community events,
build or donate simple infrastructure or facilities for community activities (e.g., small pools, sand pits, etc.), and patrol the park as a way of
deterring criminal and other undesirable activities.1 8 1 They have
small operating budgets and no formal responsibility for the park but
1 82
play an important role in park upkeep and sustainability.
Community-based "friends groups" are often assisted by local governments in a de mimimis way. Like local programs to support community gardeners, local governments help to develop and nurture
these groups by providing them with technical assistance, training,
and funding and sometimes more.1 8 3 They also award small grants to
neighborhood park organizations. 18 4 The provision of training or
financial support to local groups willing to assume some responsibility
for some park management functions can provide a powerful signal
and incentive for individuals to pool and coordinate their efforts
178

See Am non Lehavi, Property Rights and Local Public Goods: Toward a Better Future

for Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAw. 1, 34 (2004) (noting that there are over 200
"friends groups" in New York City alone).
179 See id.
180 See MADDEN ET AL., supra note 177 ("[T]hey derive their power from their ability to rally a constituency for a park or potential open space, and in many cases, to
raise outside funds.").
181 See id. at 51-115.
182 See id.
183 See id. at 107-10 (describing New York's Partnerships for Parks, ajoint venture
between the New York City Parks Foundation and the New York City Department of
Parks & Recreation, which encourages the formation, and nurtures the development
of, neighborhood parks groups across the city.); About Us, P'SHIPS FOR PARKs, http://
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011)
www.partnershipforparks.org/about-us/index.html
(describing New York's Partnership for Parks program).
184 See MADDEN ET AL., supra note 177, at 107-10. The staff shares offices with the
Department of Parks and Recreation. Its two million dollar operating budget is
funded jointly by the city and from private and corporate donations. See id.
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toward this end. So too can an agreement that recognizes private
efforts and formalizes their relationship with the local government
support the development of group norms and reduce uncertainty
over the rules of cooperation and thus support the sustainability of
the enterprise over time. Like community gardeners, the local government role largely exists to support and sustain the collectivity of
residents that has already formed.
C. Neighborhood Foot Patrols
When citizens or residents come together to engage in surveillance of their streets and other open spaces as a means of deterring
crime, they often do so as part of small scale foot patrols. These foot
patrols generally operate on a limited geographic scale, such as a
neighborhood, often work in tandem with local police departments,
and are careful not to engage in law enforcement activities such as
apprehending criminal suspects. 185 Many endogenous factors have
been cited for determining the success and endurance of these small
neighborhood patrol groups-among them are the existence of charismatic leadership, the urgency or saliency of the immediate problem,
and the size of the group (both too small and too large can be problematic). 18 6 Most of these groups are short-lived, however, because of
difficulties in recruitment, training, and commitment.'8 7
The most long-sustaining, and famous, foot patrol organization
perhaps in the country, The Guardian Angels, owes much of its sustainability to the relationships that it has formed with local governments. The Angels' relationship with local police governments and
police officials, and the support that accompanied those relationships,
strengthened and helped to sustain their role as "guardians" of neighborhood safety. Founded in New York in the late 197 0s, but with
patrol chapters in cities all over the country, the Guardian Angels
have trained thousands of local community members across the country to patrol neighborhood streets in order to deter and, when necessary, to intervene in criminal activity. The Angels arose to
prominence as an arguably rational response to cutbacks in municipal
services and the inability of local police departments to control the
intractable crime plaguing many metropolitan cities. Its members
had strong social ties to the communities they served and sometimes
185

See ROBERT K

YIN ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

ET AL., CITIZEN PATROL PROJECTS

&

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

4 (1977).

186 See Susan Pennell et al., GuardianAngels: A Unique Approach to Crime Prevention,
35 CRIME & DELINQ. 378, 379 (1989).
187 See id.
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to the criminals with whom they engaged.' 8 8 The red berets and red
jackets made them a recognizable presence during the 1980s in residential neighborhoods and high crime areas in at least fifty metropolitan cities. Angel chapters typically were initiated either by citizen
request or by the head of the organization, Curtis Sliwa, when he perceived a community in need of Angel support. 8 9
Initially, the Angels were met with a negative reaction by local
government and police officials, many of whom viewed the organization as nothing more than a vigilante group whose activities violated
9 0 Over
the law or at a minimum failed to significantly reduce crime.
time, however, city officials and the police departments around the
country began to lend them considerable support, bolstering the
Angels' popularity, which was widespread during the 1980s. By the
1990s the Angels were largely accepted by local government officials
in the fifty plus cities where they operated.1'9 A study documenting
the activities of the Guardian Angels in twenty-one cities found that a
number of police departments and city agencies had developed informal and formal agreements with the Angels in which the Angels
received training, free subway and bus passes, assigned police liaisons,
and were promised and given various information (such as crime statistics and information related to citizen arrests) .192
188 See The History of the GuardianAngels, THE GUARDIAN ANGELS, http://guardian
angels.org/about.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). In this respect they are very different from other "self-help" groups like the Minutemen operating along the U.S.- Mexico border. See Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Self-Help: ExtrajudicialRights, Privileges and
Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REv. 845 (1984).
189 See Pennell, supra note 186, at 394 (noting that over one-third of the Angel
chapters in their study were initiated by Angels founder Curtis Sliwa with the remaining chapters started by Angel members in other cities or on the basis of a community
request).
190 See Brandon, supra note 188, at 896-98; Pennell, supra note 186, at 389-91,
397.
191 Since then, the group's membership has shrunk from its peak of 1000 to about
125; many chapters of the Guardian Angels have opened up all around the world to
very mixed receptions from local governments. See Editorial, Angels Out East, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005, at L113.
192 See Pennell, supra note 186, at 390. In 1981, for example, the City of New York
had signed a memorandum of understanding ("MOU") with the organization stating
that the Angels and police would cooperate, share information and keep lines of communication open. Specifically, the Angels agreed to register their members with the
police department and to wear city issued identification cards. The MOU also prevented them from performing citizens' arrests while not in uniform. In addition, the
group agreed to receive training from NYPD community liaisons. Members receive
training in CPR, first aid, conflict resolution and martial arts and are taught the legal
limitations of citizens' arrest powers. The organization's rules spell out specific, standardized procedures for engagement and specifically forbid members from carrying
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The agreement between New York City and the Guardian Angels
to share information and to lend its members training, for example,
served an important stabilizing mechanism for the group and arguably lent considerable legitimacy to their activities, even as those activities were deemed controversial. 19 3
The Memorandum of
Understanding provided that the Angels and police would cooperate,
share information and keep lines of communication with the city
open. Specifically, the Angels agreed to register their members with
the police department and to wear city issued identification cards. In
addition, the group agreed to receive training from NYPD community
liaisons in CPR, first aid, conflict resolution, and martial arts, as well as
in the legal limitations of citizens' arrest powers.' 9 4 This agreement,
and similar ones like it in cities across the country, has been an important factor in giving the group legitimacy, establishing it as a supplement to local policing efforts and fueling its national expansion and
sustainability over many decades. 195
Mayor Giuliani of New York City notably, and publicly, fully
embraced the group as part of his law and order campaign and

weapons (although some carry handcuffs and their code allows them to use force
when necessary to confront suspected criminals). See Henry C. Collins, MunicipalLiability for Torts Committed by Volunteer Anticrime Groups, 10 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 595, 596,
611, 615, 626-28 (1981) (describing the memorandum of understanding generally).
193 See Guardian Angels' Growing Pains: Mixed Success as the Young Crime Fighters Go
National, TIME, Jan. 18, 1982, at 21 (describing the effort of the Angels to go national
after the MOU with New York City and the controversy that haunted them as they
sought to do so); see also Owen Thomas, Citizen Patrols:Self-Help to an Extreme?, CHRIsTIAN Sc. MONITOR, July 5, 1988, at 3, 8 (describing the controversy surrounding the
Angels and similar groups).

194 The agreement also specified the conditions of cooperation with the group,
including detailing the types of watchdog activities by which the groups' members
must agree to abide (such as wearing ID badges and uniforms). The MOU also prevented them from performing citizens' arrests while not in uniform. See Pennell,
supra note 186, at 390.
195 See Guardian Angels' Growing Pains, supra note 193; see also Santiago Esparza,
Guardian Angels Back in Detroit: ControversialCitizen PatrollersReturn to Help Fight City's
Crime, DETROIT NEWS,June 16, 2008, at lB (recounting effort to bring the Guardians
back to the city after being chased from the city twenty years earlier, and the effort to

draft a memorandum of understanding between the Angels and the City which would
outline the appropriate boundaries of the group's activities); Matthew Plum, Guardian Angels May Put Hartford Under Their Wings, EXAMINER (Jan. 20, 2007, 3:00 AM),
www.guardianangels.org/pdf/1716.pdf (describing Angels coming to Hartford
County and the possible drafting of a Memorandum of Understanding with the
County sheriff).
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96
helped them to gain credibility in the law enforcement community.'

Later, the group's founder, Curtis Sliwa, was given a position on
Mayor Giuliani's commission on community-police relations.' 9 7 The
group's methods arguably anticipated the arrival of community policing strategies adopted by Giuliani's Police Commissioner, Raymond
Kelly. The NYPD's adoption of community policy strategies during
the 1990s suggests that the Angels' active incorporation of local
residents into the protection of their streets was a necessary but missing component of neighborhood security. In this sense, the group filled a need unmet by the police.
D.

Park Conservancies

Unlike park "friends" groups formed to support small neighborhood parks, Park Conservancies depend much more on a stronger
local government role and partnership to establish and sustain them.
Park Conservancies are nonprofit entities which raise significant
amounts of money and co-manage large urban parks in partnership
with the local government by collaborating on planning, design, and
implementation of capital projects as well as sharing responsibility for
park maintenance and operations. 98 In some cases, park conservancies share with the local government a portion of concession revenues
each year.' 9 9
The prototype for park conservancies around the country is the
Central Park Conservancy, which was founded by several local leaders
and groups that initially established the Central Park Task Force, an
organization that began to encourage direct involvement of the public
as park volunteers and donors, but later incorporated itself as the
Conservancy. 20 0 In a groundbreaking power-sharing arrangement,
196 See Katharine Q. Seelye, Giuliani'sAngel Posse, THE CAUCUS BLOC, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 28, 2007, 6:13 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/28/giulianis-angel-posse.
197 See id. Mayor Bloomberg too lent them considerable support and as recently
as 2007 was quoted as saying that the group "makes our streets safer." Michael Wilson, Guardian Angels Seek out More Mean Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, at Bl.
198 See MADDEN ET AL., supra note 177, at 20-21. See generally Murray, supra note 9
(discussing the differences between friend groups and conservancies like the Central
Park Conservancy).
199 See TAYLOR, supra note 177, at 352 (noting that Central Park Conservancy
agreement with the City allows up to two million dollars per year from concession
revenues; but for other parks, revenues generated from concessions disappear into a
city's general funds).
200 See MADDEN ET AL., supra note 177, at 75; CentralPark Conservancy at a Glance,
N.Y.C. DEP'T OF PARKS & RECREATION (2008), http://www.centralparknyc.org/assets/
pdfs/cpc-at-a-glance.pdf.
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the Central Park administrator was appointed to serve as the chief
executive officer of both the park and the Conservancy signaling the
important role that the Conservancy would have in the restoration
and maintenance of the park.2 01 Almost two decades after its founding, the Conservancy and the City of New York formalized their relationship by signing a renewable management agreement, transferring
official management functions and day-to-day maintenance and operation of the park from the City to the Conservancy. 202
The Conservancy is run by a Board of Trustees, which includes
city officials and representatives from nonprofit organizations and private corporations, among other interests. 203 It combines donations
from individuals with corporate donations and government funding
to fulfill its budgetary needs and build its endowments. 204 A variety of
public bodies have oversight over the Conservancy's management
decisions. 205 The agreement also provides protection from a "reverse
crowd out" of public funds by establishing clear expectations for city
funding that are easy to monitor and police. 20 6 While Central Park
Conservancy may be the most widely known of park co-managers, its
201 See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 7, at 510 ("The administrator would
be appointed (or fired) by the mayor and would report to the park commissioner but
would be paid by the conservancy."). Indeed, this new administrator became the driving force behind the master plan for rebuilding Central Park and ultimately behind
the formation of the Conservancy itself. See id. at 512.
202 See CentralPark Conservancy at a Glance, supra note 200 (noting that the agreement was renewed in 2006). Under the agreement, the Conservancy, working in concert with the parks commissioner and City Hall, oversees the restoration and
maintenance of Central Park, "including the provision of programs and activities that
will increase public interest and awareness of Central Park." Oliver Cooke, A Class
Approach to Municipal Privatization:The Privatization of New York City's Central Park, 71
INT'L LAB. & WORINc-CLAss HIsT. 112, 121 (2007) (citing the 1998 Agreement
between the Conservancy and the City of New York Parks and Recreation Department); see TAYLOR, supra note 177, at 347.
203 See TAYLOR, supra note 177, at 350.
204 See id.
205 These bodies include the Art Commission of the City of New York, the five
community planning boards in the city, the Landmarks Preservation Commission,
and the City Council. See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 7, at 521.
206 See Murray, supra note 9, at 211 (citing Memorandum between the Central
Park Conservancy and the City of New York (Mar. 31, 1993) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library)). According to the Conservancy's website, it employs eighty percent of the Park's maintenance and operations staff and provides eighty-five percent
of the Park's twenty-seven million dollar annual budget through its fundraising and
investment revenue. See CentralPark Conservancy at a Glance, supra note 200. The City
pays an annual fee to the Conservancy for its services and also funds lighting and
maintenance of the Park drives and enforcement. See id.
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model has been widely replicated, though sometimes with much less
success. 20 7
Agreements or partnerships between local governments and park
conservancies serve an important coordinating and stabilizing function which enables these groups to cooperate together to undertake
significant responsibility for park management. Private involvement in
the management of urban parks is a phenomenon stretching back to
the early twentieth century. 208 Neighbors that live near urban parks,
as well as wealthy donors and residents, have long exerted some power
over park management-providing donations, labor, advocacy efforts,
and planning ideas. 209 Often, though, these efforts have suffered
from a lack of coordination and efficiencies of scale; without leadership to harness these private efforts, they often falter over time as old
groups fade and new ones appear to renew the effort to resuscitate
and improve park management. 2 10
Agreements, such as the one between the City of New York and
the Central Park Conservancy, both serve to establish important
norms regarding the limits of the group's responsibility for the
resource-i.e., reverse crowd-out protection that ensures public funds
will not be replaced by private donations-as well as formalize the
contours of the conservancy's responsibility for the day-to-day manage207 See RoSENZWEIZ & BLACKMAR, supra note 7, at 524; TAYLOR, supra note 177, at
350.
208 See EUGENE KINKEAD, CENTRAL PARK 115-16 (1990) (discussing private involvement in Central Park and fact that nearly fifty groups formed since the 1920s to resuscitate Central Park).
209 See Murray, supra note 9, at 208-09 (recounting the history of private support
and involvement in the management of Central Park over the years).
210 See id. As Murray notes about Central Park:
[T]hough private involvement existed in the 1960s and 1970s, in the
late 1970s, no one entity coordinated, and in fact no one even approved,
private participation in the park's affairs. [Robert] Moses' efforts to involve
private resources, furthermore, did not generate established mechanisms to
harness volunteer labor or donated funds. Donations generally went into
the park's overall operating fund. In other words, friends of the park could
not count on the efficacy of their contributions-monetary or in-kind. The
costs of monitoring the manager and his use of private funds could not be
higher.
In short, by the end of the 1970s, the park lacked a responsible leader.
Poor management, lack of advocacy for public support, and non-coordination of private support contributed to its decline. The conditions were ripe
for a strong leader to advocate for the park and coordinate private involvement, harnessing donations and improving outcomes by reducing monitoring costs for donors.
Id. at 209.
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ment of the park. 211 These public-private partnerships have been
widely credited for the revitalization of urban parks at a time when
some cities had "all but abdicated their role as stewards of the public
parks."2 1 2 They have the virtue of being able to avoid the red tape,
bureaucracy, and inaction in which city parks departments often
become mired; they are able to make decisions faster, raise funds, save
money, and serve as effective advocates for urban parks.2 13
This is not to say that there are not dangers and costs attendant
to these types of public-private partnership. Park conservancies are
criticized for imposing many of the costs that attend to the (at least
partial) privatization of any public good-i.e., enabling gentrification,
exacerbating ethnic and class tensions, and creating a two-tiered park
system which disadvantaged parks in less affluent neighborhoods. 2 14
Another danger worth mentioning here, but will be developed later
on, is the danger is that such agreements can lead to the ossification
of a commons management regime. This ossification can occur when
particular management practices of the group or partnership become
so entrenched that it is difficult to change course when those practices
prove to be ineffective or flawed. While, technically, the municipality
can always withdraw its support from the group's management-e.g.,
agreements are in place for a renewable time period and thus expire
at the end of that period if not renewed-in practice it is often
extremely difficult to disband the organization and the city's reliance
upon it to manage the particular common resource. Thus, while such
the public role in conservancies can serve to incentivize and stabilize
collective actions to manage an urban commons, they might also be
crafted to avoid the danger of excessive ossification.
E. Business Improvement Districts
Business Improvement Districts ("BIDs") are now a ubiquitous
feature of urban governance in most cities across the nation, provid211 See id. at 211-15 (describing the Memorandum of Understanding and the ways
it has developed over the years to shift more responsibility for park management to
the Central Park Conservancy).
212 TAYLOR, supra note 177, at 346-47 (noting also the emergence of these groups
after decades of neglect and declining budgets which left many urban parks in a state
of "utter despair").
213 See id. at 347.
214 See id. at 356 ("In New York City, for instance, Central Park Conservancy has
raised vastly more money than other city parks."); id. at 352 (noting that Marcus Garvey Park in Harlem, and others, languish in the shadows of fundraising behemoths
such as Central Park). See generally Murray, supra note 9, at 192-93 (reviewing some of
the literature exploring the costs of public-private partnerships).
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ing physical improvements, security, and maintenance of commercial
districts throughout the country. The rise and ubiquity of BIDs in
cities across the United States is attributable to a number of political
and socioeconomic factors. Among them are the general decline of
city centers and commercial neighborhoods through middle class
flight and urban sprawl, the attendant deterioration of street safety
and consumer activity, as well as the inability of local governments to
respond to these forces due to declining tax bases and limited
resources.2 1 5 BIDs are nonprofit entities formed by property owners
or businesses in a defined area of a city to improve and maintain the
2 16
neighborhood as a means to promote economic activity in the area.
BIDs provide street-level services and small-scale improvements to
streets, parks, and other common areas beyond what local government is willing or able to provide.
BIDs are enabled by state and local legislation that allows a majority of commercial property owners in a defined neighborhood to vote
to form a BID, agree to pay special assessments and assume (at least
partial) control and management (maintenance) of the neighbor21 7
hood commons-i.e., streets, sidewalks, parks and playgrounds.
BIDs are governed by local property owners in partnership with representatives from businesses, local governments, and sometimes neigh2 18 The impetus for a BID
borhood resident non-property owners.
creation typically will arise from a significant portion of the property
owners or businesses in the neighborhood, or representatives of one

215

See David J. Kennedy, Restraining the Power of Business Improvement Districts: The

Case of the Grand Central Partnership,15 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 283, 283-85 (1996) (giv-

ing examples of the genesis of the Bryant Park and Grand Central BIDs in New York
City); see also Briffault, supra note 22, at 394-95 (describing improvements made to
Bryant Park); Lorlene Hoyt & Davika Gopal-Agge, The Business Improvement District
Model: A Balanced Review of Contemporary Debates, GEOGRAPHY COMPASS 946, 948 (2007)
(outlining reasons for BID formation).
216 See generally Kennedy, supra note 215, at 285-88 (describing the basics of
BIDs).
217 See generally Briffault, supra note 22, at 412-14 (describing BID governance).
The key features of BIDs are that: (a) they cover a defined (and limited) geographic
territory in which commercial property owners or businesses in the area are subject to
additional taxes; (b) they typically fund supplemental street-level services and smallscale maintenance and capital improvements (e.g., street cleaning, garbage collection, landscaping, sidewalk widening, security patrols, etc.) over and above those
offered by city government; and (c) they are granted the limited authority by legislation to undertake services and projects within the district. See id. at 367-69, 413-30.
218 See id. at 412; Jill Simone Gross, Business Improvement Districts in New York City's
Low-Income and High-Income Neighborhoods, 19 ECON. DEv. Q. 174, 174-75 (2005).
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or more of those groups, that organize the BID and agree to tax themselves in order to fund these additional services. 2 19
Because BIDs exist only by virtue of specific legislative authority,
enabling legislation is what allows local commercial property owners
to minimize free-rider and coordination problems in order to provide
neighborhood services beneficial to the local business environment. 2 2 0 BID legislation lowers property owners' transaction costs by
arranging for the municipality to collect the mandatory assessment
from the property owners who then utilize the funds to provide services to maintain and improve the neighborhood commons. 221 BID
legislation also serves a less tangible function by enhancing the capacity of local private sector interests to achieve collective outcomes
among diverse actors whose interests may not appear at first to be well
aligned.2 22 Nevertheless, the second order collective action problem
is not completely taken care of by BID legislation. BID formation is
often costly in terms of time, energy, and money to coordinate and
prepare the necessary groundwork-and it can take years before the
219 See Briffault, supra note 22, at 377-86 (describing, the formal and practical
aspects of BID formation).
220 See id. at 369 (noting that the free-rider problem "plagues the efforts of chambers of commerce and merchants' associations to raise funds to pay for services for
their areas" and that BIDs help overcome that problem by assessing all properties or
firms in the area); Mark S. Davies, Business Improvement Districts, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 187, 201 (1997) (describing how BID assessments circumvent the freerider problem).
221 See Briffault, supra note 22, at 369-70. Briffault writes:
BIDs appeal to many-albeit not all-commercial area merchants and property owners because the districts kill two birds with one stone: They provide a
means of solving the free-rider problem that plagues the efforts of chambers
of commerce and merchants' associations to raise funds to pay for services
for their areas, while ensuring that the revenues generated by the supplemental taxes imposed on district businesses and property owners are
reserved for programs these taxpayers want, and are controlled by their
representatives.
Id.
222 See Gross, supra note 218, at 178. For communities in transition, BIDs offer a
forum to bring together diverse social and economic groups and in which mutual
interests can be identified and bridges can be built to local government. See id. Gross
cites an interview with a BID manager who held out the following example:
Take a BID like Flatbush Avenue in Brooklyn. That's an area that's really
changed. I wasn't there, but people tell me that it was a very Jewish business
area, and it really changed to an Indian and Caribbean business area. And
the cohesion that was there was no longer there. The BID was able to pull
these new ethnic groups and the different kinds of businesses together.
Id.
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process is complete. 22 3 However, despite the cost and patience
involved, local government approval of a BID allows commercial property owners and businesses within a defined geographical area to overcome collective action problems and at the same time provide the
resources to govern and manage their local commons.
BIDs vary greatly in their size and in the range of services that
22 4 Some
they provide for their neighborhood public environment.
BIDs cover large and wealthy commercial districts, such as the Times
Square BID in New York City or the Downtown District in New Orleans and are akin to a small local government in the amount of
2 2 5 The majority of
resources and the type of functions they perform.
BIDs in the United States, however, are smaller in size and in scope;
they fulfill a narrower set of functions and are often located in commercial strips that are far from their cities' central business districts,
22 6
both physically and economically.
BIDs, both large and small, have generated a vigorous debate
about the extent to which they exacerbate the uneven distribution of
public services, create negative spillover effects (e.g., crime), over-regulate public space, displace marginal populations from those spaces,
227
The
and suffer from a severe democratic accountability deficit.
acain
both
challenged,
been
governance structure of BIDs has also
accountdemic commentary and in the courts, for lacking democratic
ability and in part for its exclusion of non-property owner residents
228
from participating in BID management of their neighborhood.
223 See Briffault, supra note 22, at 383-84.
224 See Gross, supra note 218, at 176-88 (analyzing data revealing differences in
form, function, and operating practices for large and small BIDs).
225 See id. at 175 (noting that these large BIDs control multi-million dollar budgets, have large staffs, cover large geographic areas, and manage large portfolios of
activities).
226 See id. (noting that in contrast to the larger BIDs which tend to be located in
neighborhoods with a large commercial or retail base, high property values, and
ample flow of pedestrian foot traffic, the smaller BIDs tend to be located in neighborhoods with declining retail and commercial sectors, failing property values, and dwindling pedestrian traffic flows); see also Briffault, supra note 22, at 424 (referencing
New York's smaller BIDs that are centered away from Midtown Manhattan).
227 See Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, supra note 215, at 955-56 (summarizing the literature
on both sides of the debate).
228 See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that a BID voting structure was not a violation of one-person, one-vote);
Briffault, supra note 22, at 455-62 (calling for more active city monitoring and control of BIDs as a solution to the problem of BID accountability); Daniel R. Garodnick,
Note, What's the BID Deal? Can The Grand Central Business Improvement District Serve a
Special Limited Purpose?, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1733, 1760-64 (2000) (noting the lack of
municipal oversight of BIDs, the broad functions of some BIDs, and the significant
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Moreover, once they are established, there is very little oversight of
them in fact, even though most BID legislation provides the authority
for oversight by politically accountable government officials. 229
On the other hand, BIDs have been credited with revitalizing
deteriorated urban neighborhoods left unattended by local governments, having positive spillover effects outside of their districts, reducing the inequality of public services between cities and their suburbs,
and increasing democratic accountability by enhancing the voice of
local property owners and neighborhood residents. 2 30 Given the
diversity in size and function of BIDs, 231 it is easy to give credence to
the arguments of both BID proponents and opponents. However, this
diversity also highlights the importance of thinking about how issues
of scale can embed many of the costs and benefits of collective activities, a subject to which I will return in the next Part.
IV.

ENABLING COLLECTIVE ACTION

In each of the above examples, local actors are able to overcome
collective action problems to manage common urban resources in the
absence of government coercion and in the absence of property rights
in the resource. While these users cooperate in the shadow of existing
local government control over the resource, they depend, to varying
degrees, on the support or enabling of local authorities. This support
is important to their ability to overcome collective action obstacles
and/or to sustain the collectivity over time. In this Part, I turn to this
enabling role to articulate its contours and limits.
In each of the examples in Part II, the local government is loosening its control over a common resource by allowing a private collectivity to provide supplementary services and goods within a
geographically bounded area. However, the authority and control
exercised by these collectivities lack the formal legal relationship, or
the broad regulatory authority, that local governments typically possess vis-:A-vis common urban resources. That is, these groups cannot
regulate access to the resources, control or impose restrictions on
individual behavior, or otherwise usurp the local government's role in
making various policy choices about use of the resource. Moreover,
influence that BIDs can have on non-property owning residents as reasons for more
democratic accountability).
229 See Briffault, supra note 22, at 456-57 (noting that municipal governments
devote more attention to BID formation than regulation). But see Kennedy, supra
note 215, at 310-12 (noting that it may be tougher in practice than in theory to
regulate BIDs under the New York regime).
230 See Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, supra note 215, at 954-56.
231 See Gross, supra note 218, at 175 (comparing large and small BIDs).

2011]

COLLECTIVE ACTION

AND

THE URBAN

COMMONS

109

none of these collectivities hold any alienable title or property interest
in the resource. Enabling these collective management regimes to
manage or maintain common resources also does not supplant the
local government's role over that resource. We might understand
these groups as supplementing, not supplanting, the goods and services that local government traditionally provides.
A.

Limited Authority and Control over the Resource

Much in the way that states create, and restrict, the power of local
governments, 232 local government enabling also entails a mix of
grants and restrictions of power and control over a common resource.
It is a truism of local government law that local governments derive
their power exclusively from the state, either legislatively or constitutionally (e.g., home rule authority).233 This authority typically extends
to the power to control land use within its borders and to adopt laws
that govern a variety of local affairs, so long as those laws do not con234 As explained above,
flict with general or preemptive state laws.
some of the ways that these collectivities are empowered involve different forms of central government assistance and support that incentivize and reduce the cost of collective efforts. As important a role as
this assistance and support can play in these collectivities' empowerment, it is also important to examine the limitations on their power
over the common resources that they manage. As this section will
argue, the scope of the government enabling role in this context is
limited in important ways that distinguish collective action enabling
from "privatization" of a common resource-be it a park, street, lot,
or neighborhood-and that distinguish this role from the creation of
a sublocal unit of government.
1. Not Privatization
The enabling of private actors to manage common pool
resources could be viewed as a form of "privatization" of the resource.
It is, however, only to the extent that the term "privatization" is a reference to a broad spectrum of policy choices or mechanisms that shift
some responsibility from the government to private actors. That is,
232 See generally GERALD E. FRUC & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND 1-11 (2008)
(emphasizing the power state governments have over cities).
233 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 15, 23 (1990) (noting that local governments are technically creatures of their state government and enjoy delegated power subject to the
authority of the state to amend or abolish local powers and the localities themselves).
234 See id. at 15.
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collective action enabling shares some important features of privatization to the extent that it allows private actors to perform traditionally
public functions over the resource. Like privatization, collective
action enabling introduces greater flexibility and efficiency in the
management and oversight of public goods. 235 However, because it
transfers over the management and not the ultimate policymaking
function to private parties, it should be contrasted with the "privatization" of common resources in which ownership and control are transferred completely into private hands. 236
Privatization typically entails the establishment of private property rights in the resource, allocation of those rights to private actors,
and a virtually complete relinquishment of public authority over the
resource to its users. A useful contrast is a homeowners' association in
which the residents set policy for and manage the community's
streets, parks and neighborhood buildings. Most importantly, the private association holds title to those common areas. The association
has regulatory autonomy in establishing and enforcing not only land
use rules in the community but also rules governing private behavior.
These rules can include very strict zoning regulations, restrictions on
construction and painting, the placement of fences and shrubbery,
street signs, parking, pets, etc. 237
The type of enabling that local governments give to the collectivities of users in the examples above does not entail a shift in the ownership (or the legal stewardship) of open-access common resources, nor
giving up policymaking control over it. The scope of the enabling
power granted to collective efforts to manage public resources like
parks, or to engage in limited intervention on the streets, does not
include policymaking with regard to these resources. That is, the
local government and public officials retain the power to set policies
regarding access to, and use of, the resource. Collective management
regimes lack the power to tax or impose fees on users of the resource,
to limit access to the resource, or to impose health or other safety
standards on users of the resource.

235 See Jeffrey R. Henig, Privatization in the United States: Theory and Practice, 104
POL. Sci. Q. 649, 653-54 (1990) (noting that privatization premised in part on idea
that private actors should have the opportunity to break up government monopolies
and provide more efficiently these goods).
236 See Demsetz, supra note 14, at 350 (discussing the emergence of private property from common resources).
237 See Nelson, supra note 74, at 831.
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Nor Delegation

By shifting the responsibility for much of the maintenance and
management to some users, it might be said that the city delegates to
private actors a great deal of power and influence over common
resources and creates the risk that these resources will be less responsive to public needs. Local and state governments can, and do, delegate or relinquish certain functions to nongovernmental entities, or
sublocal units of government, while retaining their ownership over
the resource.2 38 A classic example of this type of delegation is the
creation of special districts for limited purposes, usually to provide for
and/or manage common resources-e.g., management of groundwater supply in a Groundwater Management Water District or delivery
2 39 The districts are coterminous with
of water in an Irrigation District.
either an entire city or region, generally matching the scale of the
resource being managed (e.g., a water basin). Special districts are
able to collect taxes, user fees and assessments from users within the
district to fund the services they provide. They are also often created
in part to respond to the deficiencies of the local government (or the
240
private sector) to manage or provide for local goods.
At first glance, the most formal of collective urban resource management regimes, the BID, resembles the type of delegated authority
that characterizes a special district. However, as Richard Briffault has
written, BIDs are quite distinct from special districts in their functions
and power. 24 1 While most special districts operate with a great deal of
legal autonomy from local governments, BIDs are legally subordinate
to the local governments that create them and have very limited policymaking authority.24 2 Unlike many special districts, BIDs lack the
See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82
L. REv. 503, 508-09 (1997) (describing four types of sublocal governance:
enterprise zones, tax increment finance districts, special zoning districts, and BIDs).
239 See Stephen N. Bretsen & PeterJ. Hill, IrrigationInstitutionsin the American West,
25 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 283, 312-30 (2006) (providing a general description of
irrigation districts); Ella Foley-Gannon, InstitutionalArrangementsfor Conjunctive Water
Management in Californiaand Analysis of Legal Reform Alternatives, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.
ENVTL. L. & POLY 1105, 1133 (2007) (discussing local water agencies managing water
rights efficiently).
240 See Barbara Coyle McCabe, Special-DistrictFormation Among the States, 32 ST. &
Loc. GOv'T REv. 121, 121-22 (2000) (explaining the factors that influence formation,
including the "restricted power theory"-when states constrain their cities' ability to
raise revenue from property taxes).
241 See Briffault, supra note 22, at 419-20 (comparing BIDs with special districts).
242 See id. at 420 (noting that for the thousands of special districts that overlap
multiple local governments or operate outside unincorporated areas, they are generally free from control by other local governments; others that are coterminous with
238
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power (a) to tax or impose fees on users of the common resource, 24 3
(b) to limit access to the resource to paying customers, and (c) to
regulate property use or resource users-e.g., the power to control
land uses within the district or the power to impose health, safety, or
aesthetic standards on either property owners, residents, or visitors to
the area.2 44 BIDs also do not hold any property rights in the resource
being managed, whereas some special districts do own such rights and
can transfer those rights for the benefit of the private interests that
govern the district.2 45 The legal position of BIDs is nicely summed up
by Briffault as follows: "[U]ltimately lacking both the police power
and the power that comes from property ownership, [BIDs] are
dependent on either municipal government action or voluntary landowner compliance to achieve their goals." 2 4 6
Nevertheless, the line between the day-to-day management of
resources and policymaking can be murky and, in practice, the two
can shade into one another. Where this happens, an important
aspect of the relationship between public authorities and these collective efforts is the ability of the local government to intervene in management of the resources, scale back the functions of the group, and/
or disband the collectivity if necessary. A very forthright assertion of
control that municipalities place on their enabling of local collectivities is to impose sunset provisions on their support of the collective
management regime.
The life of a BID, for example, is generally limited to a few years
at which time the local government may renew and extend the BID by
local governments are likely to have closer ties to the counties or municipalities that
create them but still maintain a significant degree of formal autonomy of their program and finances); id. at 439 ("[BIDs'] authority over the citizenry is so narrow, and
their autonomy relative to city government is so constrained, that they do not 'govern'
in any meaningful sense.").
243 Recall that the city collects the assessment from property owners and gives it to
the BID to use for the neighborhood services it provides. See id.
244 See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 104 (2d Cir. 1998)
(finding that although one of Manhattan's largest BIDs performs some services that a
government would perform, its responsibilities and powers are so circumscribed that
it cannot be said to exercise the core powers of sovereignty typical of a general purpose government). But see id. at 115-16, 124-25 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (noting
that despite lacking formal policymaking or regulatory control, the BID nevertheless
enjoys considerable discretion in carrying out its functions).
245 See Bretsen & Hill, supra note 239, at 327 (noting that in most irrigation districts, the district itself owns the water rights in a form that could easily be transferred
for the benefit of the landowners within the district).
246 Briffault, supra note 22, at 429.
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means of a standard reauthorization process.24 7 Park conservancy
agreements between the City and the Conservancy also have a limited
term, but are renewable.2 48 Similarly, local governments lease empty
lots to gardening collectivities to construct and maintain a community
garden, but the leases are for a particular term albeit presumptively
renewable by the city. In theory, any of these management arrangements enabled by the local government can be disbanded at the discretion and pleasure of municipal authorities. This kind of temporal
limitation embedded in many enabling mechanisms signals, at least as
a formal matter, the possibility that central government authorities
are monitoring the line between management and policymaking.
Moreover, this limitation reinforces the local government's ultimate
sovereignty over the resource.
What remains to be seen is how strong these temporal limitations
operate in practice. They are only as effective as the actual oversight
that they provide by central authorities. A different signal would be
sent, for example, if these temporal limitations were only mere formalities which gave way to presumptive renewal of the enabling support provided by the local government.
B.

Provision of Supplementary Goods and Services

A defining characteristic of voluntary efforts to manage an urban
"commons" is that they share many of the attributes of nonprofit entities organized by groups of individuals (or interests) who pool their
resources to provide additional public goods, or a level of service, that
the government does not (or no longer does) provide. As Burton
Weisbrod argued some time ago, governmental entities will provide
public goods up to a point, beyond which there can be residual unsatisfied demand among individuals whose taste for such goods is greater
than what is provided. 249 Nonprofits arise, in part, to meet this
residual demand by providing public goods or services in amounts
247 See id. at 387-89 (describing BID termination and noting that many states
allow BIDs to be created for a five or ten-year period before requiring reauthorization); Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, supra note 215, at 949.
248 See Central Park Conservancy at a Glance, supra note 200 (noting that the agreement was renewed for eight years in 2006).
249 See Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a
Three-Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND EcoNoMic THEORY 171, 181-83
(Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975); see also BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR 59-60 (1977) (arguing that people will turn to voluntary organizations
as the "second best" solution to meet their demand for collective goods).

114

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

87:1

supplemental to those provided by government. 25 0 The unmet
demand provided for by these groups is over and above the existing
level of existing public goods or services.
Much like traditional nonprofit organizations, the collectivities
that manage common urban resources provide, to varying degrees,
goods and services supplemental to what the local government already
provides. Thus, what is important to highlight here are the ways in
which the goods and services that local government provides differ
both qualitatively and quantitatively from those provided by local
collectivities.
1. Secondary Responsibility for Goods/Services
The bundle of local government goods and services that citizens
expect in exchange for their tax assessments typically include the provision of schools, hospitals, parks, transportation, sanitation, police
and firefighting, housing for the poor, and the like. 2 5 1 The level at
which a particular municipality provides these services can vary widely
across local governments and neighborhoods, and is quite dependent
on not only the demand for particular goods or services but also on
the depth of its tax base. 2 5 2 Primary responsibility for the provision of
these public goods and services is typically a core function of local
government.2 5 3 When a local government (or any level of government) decides to essentially get out of the business of being the pri250 See WEISBROD, supra note 249, at 59-61; see also Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 845 (1980) (offering an economic theory for the
rise of nonprofits as "contract failure," in which nonprofits are "a reasonable response
to a particular kind of 'market failure,' specifically the inability to police producers by
ordinary contractual devices"). Arguably neither theory fully captures the role of
nonprofits in providing or managing public goods. See Murray, supra note 9, at
197-98 (stating that even a synthesized model "fails to explain why non-median voters
do not give their funds to the government to supplement services, even though the
government also operates under the nondistribution constraint [that binds nonprofits]"). The Weisbrod model does seem to best capture the role of nonprofits where
local government turns some, if not most, of the responsibility for managing a common urban resource to a nonprofit collectivity but retains significant responsibility for
that commons, including financial support and policymaking.
251 Much of what citizens come to expect depends very much on the allocation of
responsibility for providing these services between state and local government, which
can vary by state. See generally FRUG & BARRON, supra note 232, at 92-94 (discussing
the various services cities must fund).
252 This is the core of Charles Tiebout's theory. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416-24 (1956).
253 See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (arguing that
"traditional governmental functions" include fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation). Local governments, of course, pro-
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mary provider of these goods and services, it often does so by
contracting out (or outsourcing) for their provision by private
actors. 254 The government may not release its regulatory authority, or
sovereignty, over the public good or service when it outsources its provision. But it nevertheless ceases becoming its sole provider.
Collective efforts to provide goods and services for common
urban spaces-such as cleaning and maintenance, security, block
patrols, planting trees and flowers, street lights and signs, etc.-are
tailored to the specific needs and preferences of a geographically
defined resource or community. In this sense, they are secondary to
the basic public goods and services provided by the local government,
which are typically provided on a citywide basis. This is not to say that
the private provision of goods and services does not sometimes displace those provided by the local government. In the case of some
Common Interest Communities (i.e., Homeowners Associations), government services are in fact supplanted by locally delivered services in
exchange for a tax rebate or the ability to assess property owners for
neighborhood services. 2 55 In most cases, however, the local government does not withdraw completely from its role as the primary provider of these services. Rather, the goods and services purchased by
the additional fees (or labor) paid by local residents are in addition to
those provided by the municipality. In cases where the government
has reduced its services, it would presumably restore its efforts to provide such services if and when the collectivity dissolves or ceases to
function as a service provider.
2.

Quantitative and Qualitative Differences in the Provision of
Goods/Services

One way to think about the secondary nature of the services that
these collectivities provide is to ask how much they differ, qualitatively
and quantitatively, from those typically provided by the local government. This was the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Kessler v.
Grand Central DistrictManagement Ass'n, in response to a constitutional
challenge to the Grand Central BID, one of the largest BIDs in New
York City. 25 6 There, non-property owner plaintiffs claimed that the
vide these up to the point where the state has delegated such responsibility to the
local government. See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 232, at 244.
254 See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRcr (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds.,
2009) (discussing government outsourcing).
255 See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA 122-44 (1996) (describing homeowner
associations as private governments).
256 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998). The BID encompasses 337 properties on sections
of seventy-five blocks in midtown Manhattan, including the Grand Central Terminal
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weighted voting pattern of the BID violated the "one person, one
vote" requirement under the Equal Protection Clause.25 7 Previous
Supreme Court precedent had established that the requirement
applied to governing bodies that have general governmental powers
over the entire geographic area served by the body. 258 However, the
one person, one vote requirement had been held to be inapplicable
to governing bodies that have a special limited purpose-i.e., performs limited activities that have a disproportionate effect on a definable group of constituents. 259
In assessing the services provided by the BID (e.g., sanitation,
security, and social services) in relation to the typical services traditionally provided by local governments, the Court found that indeed
the BID services do overlap with those of those provided by the city.
However, the BID's provision of these services was deemed to be secondary to those provided by the city. 2 60 They are secondary because
the BID's services are quantitatively dwarfed by those of the city and
are qualitatively different from so-called "core municipal functions."26 1 This conclusion was driven, first, by the language of the
state law that enables BID creation; this language requires that the
municipal services provided by BIDs must be "in addition to or an
enhancement of those provided by the municipality." 2 6 2 Second, the
Court noted that the City's provision of sanitation, security, and other
services is far more extensive than the limited provision of those services by the BID. 2 6 3 As an example, the BID employs sixty-three
mostly unarmed security guards, while the District is served primarily
by three City policy precincts that it overlaps. 2 64 Moreover,
"[a] Ithough they patrol the district in the expectation that their visible
railroad station, and approximately 930 residences. See id. at 95. The property within
the BID constitutes approximately 19% of the total commercial space in Manhattan
and exceeds the entire space inventory of the central business districts in cities such as
Houston, San Francisco, Dallas, Denver, and Boston. See id.
257 See id. at 98.
258 See Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1968) (involving a challenge
to selection of judges for a County Commissioners Court from single member
districts).
259 See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719,
728-29 (1973) (finding that the primary purpose of the district "is to provide for
acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin;"
it does not provide other general public services).
260 See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 105.
261 Id.
262 Id. (citing N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 980j(a)).
263 See id.
264 See id.
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presence will deter the incidence of serious crime, if law enforcement
265
is needed [the BID] security personnel call in the City police."
Similarly, the sanitation services provided by the BID are quite
limited when compared to those of the City. While BID workers bag
loose trash, they do not cart it away; the City retains the primary
responsibility for municipal refuse removal service. The BID's physical improvements to the areas-such as installing street lights, removing graffiti, cleaning street signs, providing more attractive trash
bins-are "efforts to improve the physical appearance of the district"
26 6 Even the
and not an exercise of general governmental authority.
BID's provision of homeless outreach services, the Court reasoned,
was overwhelmingly dwarfed by the services provided by the City. The
BID funded "a single outreach facility," while "the City has an entire
26 7
Department devoted to assisting the homeless."
The Court's analysis provides a useful framework with which to
assess the activities of the type of collectivities discussed in Part III,
above. First, it asks whether the relative level of services and goods
provided by these collectivities constitutes a very small portion of the
similar goods and services provided by the municipality. Second, it
asks whether the type of the services provided by these collectivities
are distinct in scope from those provided by the local government.
Presumably the provision of services to maintain or manage a commonly held public resource that is quantitatively and/or qualitatively
dwarfed by similar services provided by the local government would
withstand the suspicion that it is supplanting those services, as
opposed to simply supplementing them in geographically specific
ways.
3.

Scale and Supplementarity

The above analysis is simplistic on some level. It fails to account
for the scale of these collective efforts when viewed cumulativelyboth as an aggregate measure of the services provided by one collectivity and as an aggregate measure of the services provided by similar
collectivities (e.g., BIDs, park groups, etc.) across a municipality.
Large, corporate-dominated BIDs that manage central city commercial districts, for example, are often engaged in a very wide range of
265 Id.
266 Id. The same can be said of the operation of information booths for tourists,
the opening of a restaurant near Grand Central Terminal, and the sponsorship of
public events; all are efforts to make the district more attractive to tourists and other
consumers.
267 Id.
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services and enjoy a broad grant of authority to render and expand
their services.26 8 They arguably become, in effect, "cities within cities"
administering their services in largely unaccountable ways, with little
oversight by local government, and with substantial budgets that allow
them to self-govern much like a private neighborhood.2 6 9
Even when the scale of each individual collectivity is relatively
small (when compared to the totality of the metropolitan commons),
it might be that, if viewed cumulatively across the municipal landscape, the scale of these efforts combined begins to rise to a level that
begins to crowd out those provided by the city. 2 70 It is not difficult to
imagine a city withdrawing, or significantly further cutting back, its
resources and services from the provision of park maintenance and
support, for example, due to the increase in collectivities or groups
dedicated to managing urban parks in a city.27 1
The crowding out effect may not be as likely to occur with some
city services-police services or garage removal services, for example-that would be more difficult for small collectivities to completely
take over or for the city to easily abdicate. Thus, for example, no matter how large a crime foot patrol group becomes or expands its territory (such as the Guardian Angels), it is highly unlikely to supplant or
crowd out a local government's provision of police and other security
services to its residents and common areas. These services are delegated, or mandated, by the state to local governments in exchange for
their ability to impose taxes and fees on its residents. Moreover, as a
political matter, residents are unlikely to support the withdrawal of
basic or core municipal services such as security and sanitation. Thus,
no matter how many BIDs provide for garbage removal or street maintenance, the local government is not very likely to get out of the business of providing those services-which are quintessentially a function
of local governments.

268 See id. at 112-15 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (discussing the BID's permissible
activities and noting this about the Grand Central BID in New York City); Gross, supra
note 218, at 179-80 (describing the wide range of services and huge budgets of "corporate BIDs" as compared with "main street BIDs").
269 See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 114 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (citing N.Y.C. COUNCIL,
CITIES WITHIN CITIEs (1995)).
270 See Murray, supra note 9, at 197-98 (describing "reverse crowding out").
271 Although, as noted previously in the case of the Central Park Conservancy, it is
possible to contract around this risk of crowding out public dollars dedicated to park
management and maintenance. See TAYLOR, supra note 177, at 356 (discussing the
agreement between the Conservancy and the City).
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THREE NORMATIVE CONCERNS

Up to this point, this Article has described the ways in which local
governments enable groups of private actors who are able to overcome collective action problems to cooperate to manage open access,
common urban resources. The Article has also situated collective
action enabling along the spectrum of public and private governance
strategies for the urban commons. What the Article has not done, up
to now, is to go beyond describing this form of enabling to evaluating
it in purely normative terms.
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that there are clear
economic and community development benefits attendant to collective action enabling. The specter of unsafe or unkept streets, public
parks, and other common amenities can drive away (and repel)
existing residents, visitors, new development and commercial life from
the city. Encouraging collectivities of local, private actors to manage
common urban resources when the government cannot do so (at least
at a sufficient level) can preserve the social viability of neighborhoods
and city life, particularly in times of economic and social instability.
Even in times of social and economic stability (and even vibrancy),
enabling collective management of a local commons can produce efficiency and innovation in the provision, oversight, and use of those
resources. Moreover, there is a convincing empirical link between the
provision or existence of certain public goods such as parks, community gardens, and other local amenities provided by these collectivities
2 7 2 Local residents
and the economic value of surrounding property.
and property owners thus receive a direct economic payoff on their
cooperation with each other in improving the common resources in
their neighborhoods. 2 7 3
272 This has been referred to as the "proximate principle" to capture the idea that,
in the same way that neighborhood goods and amenities are capitalized in the cost of
housing in the most exclusive suburban communities, so too are they reflected in the
increased value of properties located closest to it in central cities. See John L.
Crompton, The Impact of Parks on Property Values: EmpiricalEvidence from the Past Two
Decades in the United States, 10 MANAGING LEISURE 203, 203 (2005); loan Voicu & Vicki

Been, The Effect of Community Gardens on Neighboring Property Values, 36 REAL EsT.
ECON. 241, 241 (2008); Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., The Impact of Business Improvement
Districts on Property Values: Evidence from New York City 31-32 (Realtors Nat'l Ctr. for
Real Estate Research, Working Paper No. 07-01, 2007).
273 Increase in property values, and attendant rents, can also spur gentrification
and the inevitable displacement of long-term residents and community members. See
Kennedy, supra note 215, at 283 (noting the improvements brought about by the
Bryant Park BID allowed neighborhood landlords to charge higher rents).
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In this Part, however, I identify some of the risks, or costs, of
some forms of collective action enabling to which policymakers have
not yet attended. The three main concerns articulated in this Part
are: The risks of scaling up this form of enabling, the distributional
issues inherent in enabling discrete groups of private actors to manage urban commons, and the real threat of ossification when these
groups are difficult to disband.
A. Scale
Let us return for a moment to Ostrom's groundbreaking study of
small scale resource management by local users and examine the
question "why is scale important" to these collective efforts. Recall
that one of Ostrom's critical insights was that successful collective
action efforts involved a community of users who are heavily dependent on the resource for economic returns and exist in an interdependent relationship with one another.2 74 Under such circumstances,
users are strongly motivated to cooperate with one another to govern
themselves to obtain joint benefits notwithstanding that each face
temptations to free ride or act opportunistically. 2 75 Further, an
important aspect of successful collective management is the ability of
the users to establish shared norms, police each other, and sanction
violators.27 6 Scale is important, then, because it identifies (and
defines) the class of users most economically and socially dependent
upon the resource and who thus have the most incentive for collective
action. Scale is also very important, as we have seen, to the ability of
resource users to cooperate together. As we have seen, scale of the
resource and the community are very strongly correlated with the ability of groups to govern themselves through informal norms, and to
create and enforce rules for resource allocation.
Scale also importantly constrains the degree of autonomy and
control that private actors have over a public resource. It is telling
that Ostrom confined her study to geographically small-scale
resources. The size of the resource very much influences both its
manageability by a collectivity of private actors, but also can dictate
how much authority and control the group will need or attempt to
seize for itself.2 77 The larger the resource the more likely it is to be
complex, both in terms of its functionality and in terms of the hetero274 See
275
276
277
fewer

OSTROM, supra note 5, at 26-27.
See id. at 26.
See id. at 22.
See Gross, supra note 218, at 179 (noting that smaller BIDs take control of
functions).
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geneity of user groups it attracts. This complexity may very well dictate a broader range of functions, and discretion, be placed in the
hands of user groups in order to effectively manage that resource.
1. Size and Authority
Not much empirical study has been devoted to the collective
management of common urban resources; however, at least one study
suggests that size matters in how these groups function and the characteristics that these groups possess.2 78 Jill Gross examined forty-one
BIDs in New York City and analyzed them based on their size and the
neighborhood context (high vs. low-income) in which they exist.2 79
Her study found that the largest ("corporate"), medium ("main
street"), and smallest ("community") BIDs each have very distinctive
characteristics which largely track their size. Importantly, the function of BIDs vary by size (and hence the variety of services they provided), and those with the widest ranging functions were the large,
corporate BIDs.2 80 Their services range from providing large-scale
capital improvements and security to marketing, street maintenance,
and social services. These BIDs cover large areas of land, brought in
large revenues, and have large boards of directors which include many
members with professional expertise (lawyers, developers, and financial experts).281 Main Street BIDs, on the other hand, are characterized by a small board of directors, consisting mainly of second
generation immigrant property owners with limited formal education,
and with much less revenue intake.28 2 Main Street BIDs' primary
functions focus on marketing and promotion of local businesses with
more limited services for security, sanitation, and street maintenance. 283 Community BIDs are the smallest in size, revenue, and
scope of services. They primarily focus on the maintenance of the
area that they govern-specifically by providing sanitation servicesand also engage in sporadic marketing efforts. 28 4
278 See id. at 179-80.
279 See id. The study analyzed BIDs based on three sizes-largest (Corporate),
medium (Main Street), and small (Community)-and based on whether they were
situated in high-income areas or low-income areas. See id. Within each size, the study
examined the revenue, number of businesses, size of businesses, size of board of
directors, number of services provided, and geographical size of the district. See id.
280 See id. at 180.
281 Examples of these types of BIDs (eleven in total) include the Times Square
and Grand Central Partnership BIDs. See id. at 179.
282 See id. at 179-80.
283 See id. at 180.
284 See id. at 181.
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It is perhaps no surprise that much of the controversy around this
form of enabling has involved groups that manage a relatively large
and complex "commons," requiring either a wide range of functions
and/or, concomitantly, wide discretion in exercising those functions.2 8 5 Both the size of the geographic commons managed by certain groups and the type and range of functions required or delegated
to the group make it difficult for local authorities to effectively monitor these groups. A distinct danger, identified by Robert Ellickson
and others, is the ways in which "insider" group norms designed to
maximize group welfare do so at the expense, or exclusion, of nongroup members. 28 6 Consider the controversy over the Grand Central
BID in New York, which was investigated for using its "social services"
function to hire low-wage homeless individuals to go out and harass
other homeless individuals from sidewalks, doorways and other public
spaces, using violence if necessary.2 87 Commentators have rightly suggested that the size and wide range of functions assumed by this BID,
one of the largest in the country, led to its exclusionary practices.2 8 8
Similarly large-scale collective management regimes pose these same
risks. The Guardian Angels, while forbidden from carrying weapons,
do carry handcuffs and use force when necessary to confront suspected criminals in large swaths of urban areas. Their "citizen patrol"
and arrest function can easily cross the line into over-zealous "vigilantism" and the use of illegal force.2 89 Large park conservancies are also
inevitably involved in daily decisions about how urban parks are used
and by whom.29 0
285 This is particularly true when the entity is able to raise large sums of moneysuch as in the case of large park conservancies and large BIDs. In those cases, the
amount of money and steady source of income is an important lever of autonomous
decision-making. See Briffault, supra note 22, at 441 ("The funds enable BIDs to hire
professional staff to plan the future development of the districts, formulate and
implement design criteria, and lobby for the districts' interests with the city government. As a result, BIDs can undertake initiatives that affect the overall appearance
and quality of life in their districts even in the absence of the power to directly tax and
regulate district residents.").
286 See ELLICKSON, supra note 18, at 169; Garnett, supra note 142, at 195.
287 See Kennedy, supra note 215, at 321-24.
288 See id. at 323-24.
289 See Thomas, supra note 193, at 3.
290 ROSENZWEIG & BLAcKMAR, supTa note 7, at 519 (citing Central Park Conservancy's attempts to set a policy for what types of events would occur on the Great
Lawn, first proposing to continue opera and symphony concert but not mass concerts
and political rallies and then finally recommending, after some pushback, that
"efforts should be made to limit gatherings to 100,000 people").
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As we have seen in the examples of collective management
regimes in Part III, there is an inverse relationship between the
endogenous variables that Ostrom and Ellickson have identified and
the degree of central government involvement. At least formally, as I
have argued, the government retains its ownership, policymaking and
regulatory authority over the resource. Yet, as a practical matter, the
size and scale of the resource necessarily influences the degree of
responsibility, range of function, and discretion allowed the collective
regime. As previously mentioned, the size and complexity of the
resource and the range of functions often mirror each other. In these
cases, the broad range of functions assumed and the discretion often
inherent in exercising those functions raises the specter of significant
slippage between the policymaking authority of central authorities
and the more limited functions of private actors managing the
resource.
2.

Size and Accountability

The above examples reveal that there can be real questions about
the extent to which the line between the regulatory and policymaking
sphere of municipal authorities who formally govern the resource and
the managerial sphere exercised by private collectivities managing the
resource begins to blur. Avoiding this line blurring might entail nothing more than ratcheting up the oversight and monitoring of these
groups, a task that, as the literature suggests, is more challenging in
practice than in theory.2 9 1 In each of the above examples there exists
an oversight mechanism in place for local officials and bodies to
review the decisions of the group. For the Conservancy, a variety of
public bodies have oversight over its decisions and it has limited
authority to make policy choices without the assent of city government.2 9 2 Large BIDs, too, are subject to significant local government
monitoring; representatives of city officials sit on the BID's managing
board and their recommendations for significant changes in land use
or policy in their districts cannot be implemented without approval by
elected city officials.2 93 Similarly, the Angels' memorandum of understanding with cities like New York includes training and oversight by
291 See Kennedy, supra note 215, at 310-12.
292 ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 7, at 521 (identifying relevant actors
including the five community boards adjacent to the park, the Art Commission of
New York City, the Landmarks Preservation Commission, and the City Council).
293 See Briffault, supra note 22, at 439, 442.
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municipal police departments designed to constrain the Angels'
autonomy and to limit their citizens' arrest powers. 29 4
In practice, however, it is not at all clear how much attention city
officials devote to monitoring these groups. While it is true that private groups formed to manage an urban commons cannot engage in
altering the formal rules or policies of the space that they manage, as
the previous examples illustrate, they do enjoy tremendous autonomy
in managerial decisions, many of which have larger policy implications-e.g., access and use decisions. We simply do not know enough
about the degree to which these groups' managerial decision making
intrudes into the policymaking domain of local government authority
over public and common goods.
Additional empirical research into the functioning of these
groups would further refine the model I have sketched here, and perhaps even alleviate the concerns over large scale collective action enabling. Future research might include asking what types of decisions
are required for the management of the resource at issue, what type
and level of authority is sought to make those decisions, and in what
ways a groups' decision making authority is legally and practically
constrained.
B. Distribution
When the government relies on private actors to provide or manage local goods and resources, it is taking the risk that, at a minimum,
those actors will do so in ways that either create or aggravate inequalities in the distribution of public goods.2 9 5 Collective action enabling
allows the decentralization and fragmentation of services devoted to
managing commons resources, inevitably raising distributional concerns. 296 The distributional issue in this context has at least two
dimensions.
1. Distribution in Two Dimensions
The first dimension of the distributional concern is that enabling
might result in the creation of different tiers of common resource
stewardship, depending on the demographics of those who live closest
to the resource and/or frequent it the most. 297 Another way of stating
294 See Collins, supra note 192, at 596.
295 See Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, supra note 215, at 953.
296 See id.
297 For example, research suggests that special districts are formed in large part
out of demand for special or additional services by the most affluent citizens. See
McCabe, supranote 240, at 126 (stating that the probability of special district creation
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the problem is that although local government "enabling" is available
to any group of private actors able to overcome free-rider and other
collective action obstacles, the scope and success of the management
or stewardship effort will depend in no small part on the assets of
those individuals involved (as well as their ability to attract additional
assets). Park management is a key example of this, as mentioned earlier. Park conservancies are able to raise and dedicate private funds
toward the improvement of larger, more prominent city parks while
parks and playgrounds in poorer neighborhoods are left underfunded
and relatively unattended.2 9 8 In a similar vein, "BIDs in low-income
neighborhoods have less fiscal and human capital to apply to service
provision than do those in high-income neighborhoods." 2 9 9 The
result is that the BIDs in these neighborhoods provide a very limited
range of services, typically that tend to address the most visible aspects
of urban decay (e.g., graffiti, sanitation, and sidewalk maintenance)
and fall far short of the kind of major capital improvements that characterize BID service in more affluent neighborhoods.
The second dimension of the distributional issue is subtler than
the first, but equally as problematic. The more that sublocal communities are able to manage their own commons, and provide for their
own public goods, and pay for them directly, the less likely they are to
be supportive of citywide services (and taxes) that provide those goods
and services to other communities. Residents and users of neighborhoods in which BIDs are perceived to be providing high levels of
security and sanitation, citywide patrol teams to be providing adequate levels of security and crime deterrence, and park groups able to
maintain and manage their local park, have no real incentive to support this same level of service provided by the municipal government
to poorer sections of the city.300 Similarly, when park goers see a popincreases with growth in per capital personal income, supporting notion that that
more districts are formed as state populations become more affluent).
298 See TAYLOR, supra note 177, at 302, 356; Cindi Katz, Power, Space, and Terror:
Social Reproduction and the Public Environment, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE 105,
105-21 (Setha Low and Neil Smith eds., 2006).
299 See Gross, supra note 218, at 184. A large part of the explanation for this is
because low-income communities tend to have lower property values than do wealthy
communities. See id. at 183.
300 For example:
Economist Moshe Adler cites the City's actions during the 1992-1993 fiscal
crisis as an example of BIDs' influence on larger City policy. During the
crisis, the City fired hundreds of sanitation workers and reduced the number
of machine-driven street cleaning days from six to four. Adler charges that
as a result of the proliferation of BIDs, "no pressure [was] coming from the
city's most influential citizens, and the former street-cleaning schedule was
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ular public green space like Central Park in pristine condition, and
well managed, they may be less likely to voice their support for greater
spending on parks in less heavily trafficked parts of the city.301 An
appropriate analogy would be to compare the city to a house and the
tax-paying voters to a thermostat: When the thermostat registers a
great deal of heat emanating from a fireplace in the living room, it
automatically reduces the temperature in other parts of the house,
leaving them far colder than they should be. 3 0 2 Less central or popular parts of the city, without the support of wealthy private partners,
will suffer from underfunding because of the success of other, more
visible areas of the city.
2.

Distributing Power

If some groups, or collectivities of local actors, lack the assets or
ability to attract sufficient assets to manage complex common
resources, one solution might be to expand, or ratchet up, the toolbox of government enabling mechanisms for use by these groups.
This toolbox might expand to grant smaller, less resourced groups
greater access to funding for large-scale capital improvements in their
neighborhoods. Local governments might also play a larger role in
assisting less resourced groups to attract resources from other institutional sources, such as private foundations. For example, local government departments or officials could co-sponsor applications for
foundation grants (or other private funding) to allow smaller groups
to engage in broader service delivery in their neighborhoods and/or
to make capital improvements.
In select cases, city (or state) governments might utilize in a very
limited fashion, or delegate the limited use of, legal tools such as its
eminent domain power, to better enable under-resourced groups
seeking to rehabilitate or revitalize neighborhood common areas suffering from widespread urban decay. This strategy obviously carries
the risk of abuse, particularly if the use of these tools is not carefully
constrained and closely monitored. However, it also has the potential
for high payoffs in areas most in need of revitalization.
never restored." Such self-interested pressure from powerful groups could
have a devastating impact on poorer sections of the City.
Garodnick, supra note 228, at 1763 (2000) (citing Moshe Adler, Why BID's Are Bad
Business, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2000, at CY17) (alterations in original).
301 MARGARET KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS 155-57 (2004).
302 I thank my research assistant, Jacob Press, for this excellent analogy.
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Consider the case of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative
(DSNI),30 a group of citizens who formed a nonprofit community
organization to revitalize their neighborhood, one of the poorest and
most desolate in Boston, enabled by the city's delegation of authority
to the group to exercise the power of eminent domain.3 0 4 Mter cleaning up many of the vacant lots that littered its neighborhood (a mix of
city-owned and privately owned parcels), enabled by various forms of
City support,3 0 5 DSNI embarked on an ambitious plan to create an
"urban village"-consisting of affordable housing, shopping, open
green space ("a town common"), and a community center.10 6 However, one of the major obstacles that faced DSNI in carrying out its
plan was that it needed to control the future use of the vacant lotsfifteen acres of vacant lots were owned by the city and fifteen acres
were privately owned, most of which had municipal tax liens against
them or were in foreclosure.30 7
DSNI convinced the city to declare a moratorium on the transfer
30
The privately
of city-owned vacant lots in the neighborhood.o
owned vacant lots were another matter, however. DSNI decided that
foreclosing on each of the scattered individual private properties
would be too time consuming and persuaded the city to grant its
newly established affiliate Dudley Neighbors Inc. (DNI), status as an
"urban redevelopment corporation," with the power to acquire by
303 I am very grateful to Elisia Klinka for research assistance on this case study.
304 See generally PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE 128-39 (1994)
(describing the detailed examination of the Dudley neighborhood in 1973); Antonio
Alves et al., supra note 166, at 737 (describing the desolate nature of the neighborhood). Neighborhood residents founded DSNI and set up its elected-resident majority board to bring together different stakeholders in the community to address
decades of neglect by the local government and a wasteland of vacant lots, which had
become a dumping ground for trash and a haven for criminal activity. See MEDOFF &
SILAR, supra, at 32.
305 The city of Boston agreed to dedicate funds and material for the resident
cleanup of the lots, erect barriers to keep illegal dumpers and criminals out, set up a
hotline to report illegal activity, and fully prosecute illegal dumpers. See MEDOFF &
SIKAR, supra note 304, at 72-74.
306 See id. at 105, 117, 128. DSNI had retained its own urban planners with support from a local foundation. See id. at 89, 115-17. DSNI also received additional
funding from other foundations. See DAC INT'L, INC., THE DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE REVITALIZATION PLAN 5 (1987), available at http://www.archive.org/
details/dudleystreetneig00daci; see also History, DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE (2008), http://www.dsni.org/history.shtml (describing the group's mission and
accomplishments, including the use of eminent domain power).
307 See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 304, at 117.
308 See id. at 90-91.
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eminent domain vacant land within the Dudley Triangle. 30 9 Subsequently, DNI was set up as a land trust to acquire the vacant lots and
oversee the development of affordable housing,3 1 0 as well as community facilities and open space,3 1 ' on the land that was formerly constituted of fragmented vacant lots. 31 2 DSNI/DNI became the first
community group in the nation to win the right of eminent
domain.3 1 3 With the help of additional private and public funding,
including a federal HUD grant (secured with the help of the City) ,314
DSNI/DNI ultimately acquired about twenty-eight of the original
thirty acres of vacant land in the Dudley Triangle and has steered the
development of hundreds of permanently affordable housing units,
six public green common spaces, and two community centers, an
urban farm, refurbished schoolyards, and numerous playgrounds.3 15
309 Under Massachusetts law, only the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) or
an "urban redevelopment corporation" authorized by the BRA to undertake a [redevelopment project] was authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain. See
MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 121A, § 7A (2011). It was the "ideal taking: one that clearly
benefits the affected community while imposing no material burden on residents or
businesses" (because no one would be displaced from the vacant lots). See Roberta L.
Rubin, Take and Give, SHELTERFORCE (Spring 2008), http://www.shelterforce.org/
article/print/215 (discussing the balance required when the eminent domain power
is used).
310 See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 304, at 119.
311 DSNI received a one million dollar grant from a state agency, and an additional five hundred thousand dollars from the City, to create the Dudley Town Common. See id. at 128-29, 153 (noting that the grant from the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Management was quite an achievement because of its
rarity, and noting that the grant was later reduced to $700,000). The Town Common
now hosts permanent artwork, farmers' markets, performances, and green spaces. See
Holly Sklar, No ForeclosuresHere,YES! MAGAZINE (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/sustainable-happiness/no-foreclosures-here.
312 See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 304, at 126-27.
313 See id. at 119.
314 With the city's help, DSNI secured a two million dollar loan from the Ford
Foundation to purchase the privately owned vacant lots via eminent domain. The city
took the "unprecedented action" of designating about $500,000 worth of city property
(the city's fifteen acres of vacant lots) as collateral to secure the loan. Steve Marantz,
City to Use Own Property as Collateral, Bos. GLOBE, July 14, 1989, at 18; see also Maureen
Mastroieni, Collaborativeand Market-Driven Approaches to Economic Development and Revitalization, 23 REAL EsT. ISSUEs 47, 49-50 (2007). After successfully asserting eminent
domain over the private vacant lots in the Dudley Triangle, the City of Boston sold the
other fifteen acres of city-owned vacant lots to DNI for one dollar. See id. at 50.
315 See Brian Ballou, Saviors ofDudley St.: Residents Work Together To Save Their Neighborhood, Bos. HERALD, Feb. 27, 2005, at 4-5; Susan Diesenhouse, GreenhouseHelps Drive
Growth in Roxbury: Group's First Commercial Project Takes Root in Facility to Produce Green
Garlic-andBring Jobs to the Neighborhood, Bos. GLOBE, May 11, 2005, at C6; Rubin,
supra note 309.
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The Dudley Street example suggests that expanding the toolbox
of enabling mechanisms as a way to address distributional concerns
has potential under some (and perhaps limited) circumstances. I suggest that there are four aspects of the Dudley Street example that
might have made it attractive, and suitable, for the City of Boston to
ratchet up its role in enabling the DSNI to rehabilitate and revitalize
its neighborhood. The first aspect is that the governance structure of
the DSNI was clearly geared toward successful collective action-it was
deeply representative/inclusive of the various constituencies who use
and depend upon the neighborhood commons, as well as inclusive of
other public and private actors who have stakes in the neighborhood
revitalization. 3 1 6 The second aspect is that the effort to revitalize the
collectively shared, open space areas of the neighborhood is at a scale
designed to benefit much of the affected surrounding community
while imposing no material burden on any member of the community. The "urban village" that it sought to create by taking over the
vacant lots was designed to avoid any loss of home or business in the
process.31 7 The third important aspect is that the revitalized "commons" remained a collective asset of the community-not only the
town commons, open spaces and community facilities, but also the
affordable housing that was built on the land. The vacant lots were
acquired by DSNI/DNI as part of a community land trust, held in
perpetuity, for the benefit of is community members.3 18 Finally, the
316 DSNI approved a thirty-one member board with sixteen board positions dedicated to community residents from the neighborhood's four major cultural groupsBlack, Cape Verdean, Latino, and White-as a way to "strengthen the collective action
and underscore the common stake of all people in rebuilding Dudley." MEDOFF &
SKLAR, supra note 304, at 57. The board also contained positions for local non-profit
agencies, local community development corporations, local businesses, local religious
groups, and one city official and one state official. See id. at 58.
317 See id. at 105-06 (noting that DSNI was looking to take over lots that were
vacant, so that no one lost their home or business in the process). The DSNI focused
its revitalization efforts on a 64-acre central, triangle area of the neighborhood ("Dudley Triangle") because it had the highest concentration of vacant lots as well as the
opportunity to encompass benefits for many of the various constituents. See id. at 117
(noting that the area was home to 2000 residents who were mostly black, Hispanic,
white and Cape Verdean, with about half of the residents living under the poverty
line).
318 See id. at 158. As for the affordable housing, after leasing its land to developers
during construction, DNI would issue long-term 99-year renewable leases to homeowners, so that the community would always own the land underneath the homes
people purchased. See Sustainable andEconomic Development, DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORsee also
HOOD INITIATIVE (2010), http://www.dsni.org/comm-econ-power.shtml;
MEDOFF & SIAR, supra note 304, at 158 (describing the land trust held by DSNI);
Rubin, supra note 306. Also, through its ninety-nine year ground lease, DNI could
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enabling was a key part of the public-private partnership that emerged
between the DSNI and the City of Boston in which both, as part of a
"memorandum of understanding," are involved in "every stage of
planning for new, city-sponsored projects within the
neighborhood."319
C. Ossification
One common characteristic of the enabling relationships
between local authorities and collectivities of private actors who manage the urban commons is the existence of agreements that have a
limited term.3 20 Some examples of these mentioned earlier are sunset
clauses for BIDs, park conservancy agreements that expire after a limited period of time, and short term leases for community gardeners.8 2 1 In theory, then, local government enabling of private
collectivities carries less of a risk of entrenching regulatory standards
than traditional land use rules. Unlike zoning and other land use
rules, enabling also does not create a collective property right in the
commons.
While it is true that government officials in theory can withdraw
support at any time from the collectivity or organization managing the
resource, as a practical matter this often does not occur. BIDs very
rarely dissolve, for instance.32 2 Instead, as permitted by state-enabling
legislation, BIDs renew and extend their term limits by means of a
require that its properties be used for purposes set forth by the community. See Sustainable and Economic Development, supra. DNI also established through the lease that
homes could only be resold for either 5% per year increase or the rate of inflation,
whichever is less. See id. Thus, if the residents sell, they will not profit more than the
value that the house has appreciated, and any appreciation in land value stays within
the community. See id. Each homeowner is a voting member of the community land
trust and gets to help shape its policies. See id.
319 See Rubin, supra note 309. This means that the City and DSNI jointly plan and
sponsor community meetings for residents to voice concerns "about issues ranging
from land-use options and housing needs to traffic, transportation, and physical
design." Id. Staff from both the City and DSNI provide visual models and other information to "help community members evaluate the options." Id.
320 See Briffault, supra note 22, at 387-89; Central Park Conservancy at a Glance,
supra note 200.
321 See Briffault, supra note 22, at 387-89; Central Park Conservancy at a Glance,
supra note 200.
322 A New York City BID, for example, can only be dissolved by a City Council
resolution or upon written petition of owners of at least fifty one percent of the
assessed valuation of benefited real property, and fifty-one percent of the owners of
such property. BIDs cannot be dissolved if they retain an outstanding debt, such as
bonds or long term loans. See TENANTNET, www.tenant.net/oversight/BID/Gidwy.
html (last visited Sep. 25, 2011).
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standard reauthorization process.3 23 Agreements with park groups
and park conservancies, and leases with community gardeners, are
also regularly renewed by local governments. Even when the government decides not to renew an agreement, the expectation that it
should can easily morph into a claim that there exists a de facto, if
limited, property right in the resource that should prevent the government from terminating the arrangement without a strong justification. 3 2 4 Even in the absence of a formal agreement, the length of the
relationship between the parties and the degree of control that the
government has ceded is likely to render it very difficult for the government to disentangle itself from the management relationship.
The presumptive renewal, or continuation, of these arrangements is quite understandable from the local government (legal steward's) point of view. Why would the government want to disturb a
management arrangement that has revitalized the commons, maintained it, and perhaps brought in additional sources of revenue (or
labor) to sustain it? Nevertheless, the option to terminate or renew is
useful, and even critical, from the point of view of building in accountability of the collectivity to the public/public officials. That is, if the
management of a collective resource imposes high costs (or externalities) on others, the government can be petitioned to withdraw its support and encouragement from the group and to re-assert its full
management and control over the resource. In this way, the local government maintains a degree of accountability to the public for whom
the resource is dedicated or held in trust.
At the same time, the longer and more entrenched the group has
become, the more difficult it will be for the government to withdraw
its support. Such entrenchment raises the danger of ossification that
is lurking in the establishment of these collectivities over time. This
danger is powerfully characterized by Brigham Daniels as the threat of
"commons cartels."3 25 As Daniels argues, commons scholars tend to
ignore the rigidity that can take hold of institutions created (and sustained) as a solution to the tragedy of the commons. He argues that
because commons scholars tend to define successful management of
the commons as the establishment of long-enduring institution, it is
easy to overlook the ways in which commons management becomes
323 See Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, supra note 215, at 949.
324 See Foster, supra note 164, at 534-46 (discussing lawsuit brought against community gardeners in New York City to prevent the City from re-claiming the garden
spaces for housing development).
325 See Brigham Daniels, Breaking Commons Cartels 1 (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://dc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/180/Daniels
203301.pdf.txtjsessionid=7B26EE19C3CA9AF02DO9589AF2F5139B?sequence=2.
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static and commons institutions become rigid in the face of emerging
and competing values. Thus,
[t]he very institutions that provided a cure to the tragedy of the
commons intentionally favors one commons use. Given what we
know about the principles of long-enduring institutions, they work
to provide one set of commons users a privileged place at the
table.... They punish those who challenge the values of incumbent
users: credible threats prove credible, and incumbents use them to
thrash rivals. Institutions promote cooperation among incumbents:
collective action is cheaper for incumbents, and incumbents economize in working together to shore up their holdings and to fend off
rivals. 3 26
The threat of "commons cartels" may be more theoretical than
real at this point but it is worth inquiring whether groups that manage
an urban commons for a lengthy period of time become ossified in
their approaches to that management. This is particularly a risk
where the identity of a particular commons has become closely identified with the values and preferences of the particular collectivity that
has managed it on a long-term basis. If the answer is yes, then we
should inquire whether there exist competing or rival claims to the
use of the commons and how the collectivity treats and resolves those
claims. As Daniels argues, "[o]ur tendency to focus on one use of the
commons at a time sets institutions on a path-dependent course at the
outset."3 2 7
If one of the benefits of allowing collectivities to manage an
urban commons is the innovation and flexibility these groups bring to
task, then ossification of a management regime poses significant dangers. One danger is that some commons management groups may be
resisting the type of change in the use of the commons that is healthy
over the long run and that best reflects changes in the way that society
(or the community) views the commons.3 28 Another danger is that
incumbent institutions may develop, and even expand, their "grip" on
the commons in ways that work to the advantage of particular commons users and political power brokers. 329 Existing commons management regimes, when confronted with emerging values, should
ideally be able to remain flexible by maintaining their core identity as
326 Id. at 10.
327 Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVrL. L. 515,
521 (2007).
328 See id.
329 See id. ("Rent-seeking, agency capture, and symbolic politics naturally follow,
and disenfranchised stakeholders are often marginalized.").
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stewards for the various constituencies that use and depend on the
commons, both now and in the future.33 0
CONCLUSION

This Article has offered a framework for thinking through the
governance challenges that arise in the context of rivalrous, common
urban resources. The framework begins with an examination of how
an urban commons "tragedy" might unfold in the context of a regulated resource. The concept of regulatory slippage is offered to
explain how a formally regulated resource can become increasingly
more open and rivalrous over time as a result of a retrenchment in
government oversight and/or laxity in the enforcement of use restrictions. The resulting degradation and exploitation of the resource
raises anew the governance question. Scholars have proposed governance solutions that involve additional regulation or, alternatively,
privatization of the resource. This Article charts and develops a third
solution that has taken root in cities across the country. Collective
management of common urban resources is not a new phenomenon
but it has been largely ignored and left underdeveloped by legal scholars. This Article develops the idea, explores its contours and normative limitations, and examines areas for further scholarly study and
policymaking reforms.

See Kristin A. Carpenter, Sonia Katyal, & Angela Riley, In Defense of Property 118
L.J. 101,147-57 (2009) (describing stewardship in shared resources as "involving
the fiduciary duty of care or the duty of loyalty to something that one does not own"
and developing the concept of stewardship vis-21-vis cultural property).
330
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